In the newsvendor problem, a decision maker facing random demand for a perishable product decides how much of it to stock for a single selling period. This simple problem with its intuitively appealing solution is a crucial building block of stochastic inventory theory, which comprises a vast literature focusing on operational efficiency. Typically in this literature, market parameters such as demand and selling price are exogenous. However, incorporating these factors into the model can provide an excellent vehicle for examining how operational problems interact with marketing issues to influence decision making at the firm level. In this paper we examine an extension of the newsvendor problem in which stocking quantity and selling price are set simultaneously. We provide a comprehensive review that synthesizes existing results for the single period problem and develop additional results to enrich the existing knowledge base. We also review and develop insight into a dynamic inventory extension of this problem, and motivate the applicability of such models.

W e consider the problem of a newsvendor that is served by multiple suppliers, where any given supplier is defined to be either perfectly reliable or unreliable. By perfectly reliable we mean a supplier that delivers an amount identically equal to the amount desired, as is the case in the most basic variant of the newsvendor problem. By unreliable, we mean a supplier that with some probability delivers an amount strictly less than the amount desired. Our results indicate the following effects of unreliability: From the perspective of the newsvendor, the aggregate quantity ordered is higher than otherwise would be ordered if the newsvendor's suppliers were completely reliable. From the perspective of end customers, however, the service level provided is lower than otherwise would be provided if the newsvendor's suppliers were completely reliable. From the perspective of the suppliers, although reliability affects how much is ordered from a selected supplier, cost generally takes precedence over reliability when it comes to selecting suppliers in the first place. Even perfect reliability is no guarantee for qualification since, in an optimal solution, a given supplier will be selected only if all less-expensive suppliers are selected, regardless of the given supplier's reliability level. Nevertheless, the relative size of a selected supplier's order depends on its reliability.

T his paper considers a firm's price and inventory policy when it faces uncertain demand that depends on both price and inventory level. The authors extend the classic newsvendor model by assuming that expected utility maximizing consumers choose between visiting the firm and consuming an exogenous outside option. The outside option represents the utility the consumer forgoes when she chooses to visit the firm before knowing whether or not the product will be available. The authors investigate both the case in which the firm's price is exogenous and the case in which price is chosen optimally. The paper makes two contributions. First, the authors show that the firm holds more inventories, provides a higher fill rate, attracts more customers, and earns higher profits when it internalizes the effect of its inventory on demand. Second, the authors show that in the endogenous price case the firm's two-dimensional decision problem can be reduced to two, sequential, single-variable optimizations. As a result, the endogenous-price case is as easy to solve as the exogenousprice case.

Overconfidence is one of the most consistent, powerful, and widespread cognitive biases affecting decision making in situations characterized by random outcomes. In this paper, we study the effects and implications of overconfidence in a competitive newsvendor setting. In this context, overconfidence is defined as a cognitive bias in which decision makers behave as though the outcome of an uncertain event is less risky than it really is. This bias unequivocally leads to a lower expected profit for a newsvendor that does not compete on inventory availability. Nevertheless, it can be a positive force for competing newsvendors. Indeed, we find that when the product’s profit margin is high, overconfidence can lead to a first-best outcome. In a similar vein, we also show that the more biased of two competing newsvendors is not necessarily destined to a smaller expected profit than its less biased competitor. This paper was accepted by Manel Baucells, decision analysis.

This paper shows that the effect of different distribution channel structures on product quality depends on the type of consumer heterogeneity and its distribution in a market. When consumer heterogeneity is uniformly distributed either vertically on willingness to pay or horizontally on transaction costs, a manufacturer may provide the same or lower product quality in a decentralized channel than in a centralized channel. In contrast, when consumer heterogeneity follows a more general distribution on willingness to pay, under certain conditions, the manufacturer may provide higher product quality in a decentralized channel than in a centralized channel. Decentralization also may lead to a higher product quality if consumer heterogeneity is uniformly distributed both vertically and horizontally, but not if consumer heterogeneity is uniformly distributed vertically on each of two product-quality attributes. Additionally, competition at the retail level may amplify these findings. This paper was accepted by J. Miguel Villas-Boas, marketing.