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This paper presents a philosophical argument for divine providence by Aquinas. I suggest that upon returning to Aristotle's Physics and Metaphysics to prepare his commentaries on these texts, Aquinas recognized that his stock argument from natural teleology to divine providence (the fifth way and its versions) needed to be filled out. Arguments from natural teleology can prove that God's providence extends to what happens for the most part, but they cannot show that God's providence also includes what happens for the least part. In order to prove the latter, Aquinas claims that one must argue from a higher science, which he then does with all characteristic clarity. This paper presents this argument, discusses what this means for his previous arguments from teleology, and discusses the argument's relevance to the contemporary discussion about creation and evolution. I.A quinas's fifth way begins by noting that we observe that some things that lack cognition, namely, natural bodies, act for the sake of an end. This is apparent from the fact that they act in the same way always and for the most part (semper et frequentius) pursuing what is best. From this he concludes that these things come to an end by intention and not by chance. 1 The phrase "always or for the most part" comes from Book II of Aristotle's Physics. Aristotle used the phrase to emphasize that teleology and chance exist 1 ST I, q. 2, a. 3, San Paolo edition (Rome, 1962), 14: "Quinta via sumitur ex gubernatione rerum. Videmus enim quod aliqua quae cognitione carent, scilicet corpora naturalia, operantur propter finem: quod apparet ex hoc quod semper aut frequentius eodem modo operantur, ut consequantur id quod est optimum; unde patet quod non a casu, sed ex intentione perveniunt ad finem." See also Quaestiones disputatae de veritate, q. 5, a. 2 (Leon.22/1.143-4.157-62): "ea enim quae casu accidunt, proveniunt ut in minori parte; videmus autem huiusmodi convenientias et utilitates accidere in operibus naturae aut semper, aut in maiori parte; unde non potest esse quod casu accidant; et ita oportet quod procedant ex intentione finis.

I n the Aristotelian tradition, there are two broad answers to the basic question "What is soul?" On the one hand, the soul can be described by what it does. From this perspective, the soul seems to be composed of various different parts or powers (potentiae) that are the principles of its various actions. On the other hand, the soul seems to be something different, namely, the actual formal principle making embodied living substances to be the kinds of things that they are. Contemporary Aristotelians are split on how to interpret Aristotle: Anna Marmodoro (2013, 18), Thomas Johansen (2012, 81), and most others argue that the soul is nothing but a kind of cluster or group of powers. Rebekah Johnston (2011), however, strongly disagrees and argues that the soul is only the actual principle of embodied substance. 1 Aquinas provides a novel and neglected solution to this problem and would argue that both sides are partly right but that either side is insufficient without the other.

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