We confirm the negative relationship between household debt and future GDP growth documented in Mian, Sufi, and Verner (2017) for a wider set of countries over the period 1950-2016. Three mutually reinforcing mechanisms help explain this relationship. First, debt overhang impairs household consumption when negative shocks hit. Second, increases in household debt heighten the probability of future banking crises, which significantly disrupts financial intermediation. Third, crash risk may be systematically neglected due to investors' overoptimistic expectations associated with household debt booms. In addition, several institutional factors such as flexible exchange rates, higher financial development and inclusion are found to mitigate this impact. Finally, the tradeoff between financial inclusion and stability nuances downside risks to growth.

No abstract

This paper contributes to a growing literature on the ambiguous effects of risk diversification. In our model, banks hold claims on each other's liabilities that are marked-to-market on the individual financial leverage of the obligor. The probability of systemic default is determined using a passage-problem approach in a network context and banks are able to internalize the network externalities of contagion through their holdings. Banks do not internalize the social costs to the real economy of a systemic default of the banking system. We investigate the optimal diversification strategy of banks in the face of opposite and persistent economic trends that are ex-ante unknown to banks. We find that the optimal level of risk diversification may be interior or extremal depending on banks exposure the external assets and that a tension arises whereby individual incentives favor a banking system that is over-diversified with respect to the level of diversification that is desirable in the social optimum.

No abstract