The cognitive and structural deficits in OSA may be secondary to sleep deprivation and repetitive nocturnal intermittent hypoxemia. These negative effects may be recovered by consistent and thorough treatment. Our findings highlight the importance of early diagnosis and successful treatment of this disorder.

Functional magnetic resonance imaging was used to assess the cortical areas active during the observation of mouth actions performed by humans and by individuals belonging to other species (monkey and dog). Two types of actions were presented: biting and oral communicative actions (speech reading, lip-smacking, barking). As a control, static images of the same actions were shown. Observation of biting, regardless of the species of the individual performing the action, determined two activation foci (one rostral and one caudal) in the inferior parietal lobule and an activation of the pars opercularis of the inferior frontal gyrus and the adjacent ventral premotor cortex. The left rostral parietal focus (possibly BA 40) and the left premotor focus were very similar in all three conditions, while the right side foci were stronger during the observation of actions made by conspecifics. The observation of speech reading activated the left pars opercularis of the inferior frontal gyrus, the observation of lip-smacking activated a small focus in the pars opercularis bilaterally, and the observation of barking did not produce any activation in the frontal lobe. Observation of all types of mouth actions induced activation of extrastriate occipital areas. These results suggest that actions made by other individuals may be recognized through different mechanisms. Actions belonging to the motor repertoire of the observer (e.g., biting and speech reading) are mapped on the observer's motor system. Actions that do not belong to this repertoire (e.g., barking) are essentially recognized based on their visual properties. We propose that when the motor representation of the observed action is activated, the observer gains knowledge of the observed action in a "personal" perspective, while this perspective is lacking when there is no motor activation.

This paper studies the cognitive processes that enable decision makers to switch between exploitation and exploration. We use functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) in a sample of expert decision makers to make two main contributions. First, we identify and contrast the specific brain regions and cognitive processes associated with exploitation and exploration decisions. Exploitation activates regions associated with reward seeking, which track and evaluate the value of current choices, while exploration relies on regions associated with attentional control, tracking the value of alternative choices. Second, we propose and test the idea that stronger activation of the brain circuits related to attentional control allows individuals to achieve better decision‐making performance as a result. We discuss the implications of these results for strategic management research and practice. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd

Decision making under risk entails the anticipation of prospective outcomes, typically leading to the greater sensitivity to losses than gains known as loss aversion. Previous studies on the neural bases of choice-outcome anticipation and loss aversion provided inconsistent results, showing either bidirectional mesolimbic responses of activation for gains and deactivation for losses, or a specific amygdala involvement in processing losses. Here we focused on loss aversion with the aim to address interindividual differences in the neural bases of choice-outcome anticipation. Fifty-six healthy human participants accepted or rejected 104 mixed gambles offering equal (50%) chances of gaining or losing different amounts of money while their brain activity was measured with functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI). We report both bidirectional and gain/loss-specific responses while evaluating risky gambles, with amygdala and posterior insula specifically tracking the magnitude of potential losses. At the individual level, loss aversion was reflected both in limbic fMRI responses and in gray matter volume in a structural amygdala-thalamus-striatum network, in which the volume of the "output" centromedial amygdala nuclei mediating avoidance behavior was negatively correlated with monetary performance. We conclude that outcome anticipation and ensuing loss aversion involve multiple neural systems, showing functional and structural individual variability directly related to the actual financial outcomes of choices. By supporting the simultaneous involvement of both appetitive and aversive processing in economic decision making, these results contribute to the interpretation of existing inconsistencies on the neural bases of anticipating choice outcomes.