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The Court of Justice has always reasoned its judgments concerning golden shares on the basis of Art. 63 TFEU, despite claims before it have also involved submissions of breach of Art. 49 TFEU. Gradually, it has changed its approach and freedom of establishment has become an independent focus when assessing whether use of golden shares is lawful. This paper is aimed to grasp the new trend. Firstly, it analyses the original setting of the question by the Court in order to understand how free movement of capital is still important in the assessment of golden shares and why there is no definitively separation from it. Successively, it examines motivations and the modalities of the change of the freedom involved. Finally, it seeks to infer the implications and extent of the variation in progress.

The recent financial crisis in the Euro area has shown the close and negative relationship between the balance sheets of some Member States and their banks. The EU, in order to interpose in such a relationship, has taken several measures. One of the most important is the institution of a resolution regime for banks which provides a specific role for the private sector. This paper is aimed at analysing the EU legal framework on the matter. Firstly, it grasps the original setting of the question with the purpose of understanding why sovereign risk and bank risk are strictly linked. Successively, it examines the EU rules defining resolution for banks. Within this ambit, it focuses on the bail-in and the limits on its application as well as on the Single Resolution Fund. Furthermore, it evaluates the role at issue in the light of the right to property. Finally, it analyses the assessment of the Court of Justice on whether, and to what extent, the involvement of the private sector in resolution for banks is lawful.