A high-temperature high-concentration pressurized-air solar receiver is considered for driving a power generation Brayton cycle. The modular design consists of a cylindrical SiC cavity surrounded by a concentric annular reticulated porous ceramic (RPC) foam contained in a stainless steel pressure vessel, with a secondary concentrator attached to its windowless aperture. Experimentation was carried out in a solar tower for up to 47 kW of concentrated solar radiative power input in the absolute pressure range of 2-6 bar. Peak outlet air temperatures exceeding 1200 °C were reached for an average solar concentration ratio of 2500 suns. A notable thermal efficiency—defined as the ratio of the enthalpy change of the air flow divided by the solar radiative power input through the aperture—of 91% was achieved at 700 °C and 4 bar.

Risk transfer is a key risk and capital management tool for insurance companies. Transferring risk between insurers is used to mitigate risk and manage capital requirements. We investigate risk transfer in the context of a network environment of insurers and consider capital costs and capital constraints at the level of individual insurance companies. We demonstrate that the optimisation of profitability across the network can be achieved through risk transfer. Considering only individual insurance companies, there is no unique optimal solution and, a priori, it is not clear which solutions are fair. However, from a network perspective, we derive a unique fair solution in the sense of cooperative game theory. Implications for systemic risk are briefly discussed.

Risk transfer is a key risk and capital management tool for insurance companies. Transferring risk between insurers is used to mitigate risk and manage capital requirements. We investigate risk transfer in the context of a network environment of insurers and consider capital costs and capital constraints at the level of individual insurance companies. We demonstrate that the optimisation of profitability across the network can be achieved through risk transfer. Considering only individual insurance companies, there is no unique optimal solution and, a priori, it is not clear which solutions are fair. However, from a network perspective, we derive a unique fair solution in the sense of cooperative game theory. Implications for systemic risk are briefly discussed.