Software-defined networks provide new facilities for deploying security mechanisms dynamically. In particular, it is possible to build and adjust security chains to protect the infrastructures, by combining different security functions, such as firewalls, intrusion detection systems and services for preventing data leakage. It is important to ensure that these security chains, in view of their complexity and dynamics, are consistent and do not include security violations. We propose in this paper an automated strategy for supporting the verification of security chains in software-defined networks. It relies on an architecture integrating formal verification methods for checking both the control and data planes of these chains, before their deployment. We describe algorithms for translating specifications of security chains into formal models that can then be verified by Satisfiability Modulo Theories (SMT) solving or model checking. Our solution is prototyped as a package, named Synaptic, built as an extension of the Frenetic family of SDN programming languages. The performances of our approach are evaluated through extensive experimentations based on the CVC4, veriT, and nuXmv checkers.

To ensure a high availability, communication networks provide resilient routing mechanisms that quickly change routes upon failures. However, a fundamental algorithmic question underlying such mechanisms is hardly understood: how to verify whether a given network reroutes flows along feasible paths, without violating capacity constraints, for up to k link failures? We chart the algorithmic complexity landscape of resilient routing under link failures, considering shortest path routing based on link weights as e.g. deployed in the ECMP protocol. We study two models: a pessimistic model where flows interfere in a worst-case manner along equal-cost shortest paths, and an optimistic model where flows are routed in a best-case manner, and we present a complete picture of the algorithmic complexities. We further propose a strategic search algorithm that checks only the critical failure scenarios while still providing correctness guarantees. Our experimental evaluation on a benchmark of Internet and datacenter topologies confirms an improved performance of our strategic search by several orders of magnitude.

Software-defined networking offers new opportunities for protecting end users and their applications. In that context, dedicated chains can be built to combine different security functions, such as firewalls, intrusion detection systems and services for preventing data leakage. To configure these security chains, it is important to have an adequate model of the patterns that end user applications exhibit when accessing the network. We propose an automated strategy for learning the networking behavior of end applications using algorithms for generating finite state models. These models can be exploited for inferring SDN policies ensuring that applications respect the observed behavior: such policies can be formally verified and deployed on SDN infrastructures in a dynamic and flexible manner. Our solution is prototypically implemented as a collection of Python scripts that extend our Synaptic verification package. The performance of our strategy is evaluated through extensive experimentations and is compared to the Synoptic and Invarimint automata learning algorithms.

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