Recent studies suggest that a brain network mainly associated with episodic memory has a more general function in imagining oneself in another time, place or perspective (e.g. episodic future thought, theory of mind, default mode). If this is true, counterfactual thinking (e.g. 'If I had left the office earlier, I wouldn't have missed my train.') should also activate this network. Present functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) study explores the common and distinct neural activity of counterfactual and episodic thinking by directly comparing the imagining of upward counterfactuals (creating better outcomes for negative past events) with the re-experiencing of negative past events and the imagining of positive future events. Results confirm that episodic and counterfactual thinking share a common brain network, involving a core memory network (hippocampal area, temporal lobes, midline, and lateral parietal lobes) and prefrontal areas that might be related to mentalizing (medial prefrontal cortex) and performance monitoring (right prefrontal cortex). In contrast to episodic past and future thinking, counterfactual thinking recruits some of these areas more strongly and extensively, and additionally activates the bilateral inferior parietal lobe and posterior medial frontal cortex. We discuss these findings in view of recent fMRI evidence on the working of episodic memory and theory of mind.

This functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) research explores how observers make causal beliefs about an event in terms of the person or situation. Thirty-four participants read various short descriptions of social events that implied either the person or the situation as the cause. Half of them were explicitly instructed to judge whether the event was caused by something about the person or the situation (intentional inferences), whereas the other half was instructed simply to read the material carefully (spontaneous inferences). The results showed common activation in areas related to mentalizing, across all types of causes or instructions (posterior superior temporal sulcus, temporo-parietal junction, precuneus). However, the medial prefrontal cortex was activated only under spontaneous instructions, but not under intentional instruction. This suggests a bias toward person attributions (e.g. fundamental attribution bias). Complementary to this, intentional situation attributions activated a stronger and more extended network compared to intentional person attributions, suggesting that situation attributions require more controlled, extended and broader processing of the information.

It has been suggested that the temporo-parietal junction (TPJ) is involved in inferring immediate goals and intentions from behaviors, whereas the medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC) integrates social information, such as traits, at a more abstract level. To explore the differential role of the TPJ and mPFC, participants read several verbal descriptions about an agent. Embedded in a factorial design, in one-half of the trials (behavior condition), the agent was engaged in a simple goal-directed behavior, whereas in the other half this description was absent. In another half of the trials (trait condition), the participants had to answer a question about a trait of the agent, whereas in the other half the question was about the agent's physical appearance. The results revealed that the dorsal mPFC was recruited when participants inferred the agent's trait, irrespective of a behavioral description. In contrast, the TPJ, posterior superior temporal sulcus (pSTS), anterior intraparietal sulcus, and premotor cortex were activated when goal-directed behavioral information was presented, irrespective of a trait question. These findings confirm that in a social context, the TPJ (and pSTS) is activated for understanding goal-directed behaviors, whereas the mPFC is involved in processing traits.

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