Why has China's foreign policy become more assertive since 2009, and what is driving Beijing's foreign policy orientations? Given the significance of China's rise over the past few decades, it is surprising that this question has not been subjected to systematic analysis as well as general investigation within scholarly research. This article serves to examine the sources of China's assertiveness using a system‐level, unit‐level and individual‐level analysis. This article first looks at system‐level explanations such as state power, external threats and national interests, and then considers unit‐level factors including bureaucratic competition, struggles of the elite and the surge of nationalism. However, both system‐level and unit‐level explanations alone fail to account for China's more assertive foreign policy. This suggests that individual factors play a major role in explaining the country's more assertive external behaviour. This is especially the case when the perceptions of the political elite are deeply embedded in the state leader's preferences. This finding can enhance our understanding of why traditional explanations, that do not incorporate the role of the state leader, may fail to predict Chinese foreign policy behaviour. To understand better the implications of China's rise, therefore, we must take into account the role of the state leadership and its impact on China's growing influence in international politics.

The current debate on the question of whether China has become more assertive involves two opposing opinions on Beijing’s foreign policy orientation. This article argues that the key question is whether China is about to change its approach to foreign policy, one which has enabled its “peaceful rise” in recent decades. It examines variations in Chinese foreign policy by developing a set of interrelated indicators of changes in a state’s external behavior. The results reveal a marked increase in China’s military spending and power projection capability, foreign aid, and diplomatic initiatives after the 2008 global financial crisis, as well as an expansion of Beijing’s alliance commitments through the establishment of partnership relationships around the world. These findings not only support the increased assertiveness argument but also indicate a larger transformation in Chinese foreign policy—China is becoming more active diplomatically as part of its quest for great power status.

This article examines Taiwan's new hedging policy toward China and its evolving relations with Japan. Taiwan under President Ma Ying-jeou focused on hedging its bets against China's rise through engagement, accommodation, and soft balancing. Meanwhile, Taipei and Tokyo are also forging a strategic partnership as they cautiously achieve low-commitment agreements for deeper cooperation, including signing an important fisheries agreement. Nevertheless, both international and domestic challenges may constrain the flexibility of Taipei's hedging strategy. Given the uncertainty and complexity in East Asia, Taipei will continue its hedging strategy as a way to expand its external cooperation in the region.

This study examines Kim Dae Jung’s 1998–2002 Sunshine Policy toward North Korea and the mutual reassurances between Taiwan and China from 2008 to 2013. Furthermore, it explores factors contributing to the failure of trust-building in the two cases, and the implications for reassurance theory as well as the prospects for inter-Korean and cross-Taiwan Strait relations.

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