While the EU takes on an increasingly global regulatory role, we have only a limited understanding of how or when foreign firms influence EU regulation. Multinational Corporations (MNCs) have many of the power resources that determine lobbying success. We argue, however, that high salience blunts foreign corporate power. High salience generates legitimacy concerns for EU institutions, creating a political opportunity structure that favours pluralistic participation. Civil society can point to the instrumental power of foreign firms as a means to contaminate business interests, amplifying consumer voices in the process. We label this the MNC‐Coalition paradox. We investigate the European Union's General Data Protection Regulation to assess our argument, as the revelations made public by Edward Snowden created an exogenous shock in salience. Highlighting the presence of MNCs – such as Google and Facebook – in the lobbying process allowed civil society leaders to delegitimize business preferences and bolster consumer protection. In addition to the theoretical contribution, our evidence sheds light on the policy process behind legislation that will shape fundamental civil liberties and privacy rights not only for Europeans but globally.

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The proliferation of production networks and cross-border contracting is frequently cited as empowering globally active corporations to skirt, and shape, national regulations. While scholars often focus on the political gains from these new forms of business organization, we shift the conversation to the potential political costs of global firm reorganization. The spread of corporate subsidiaries and global supply-chain networks leave firms vulnerable to a host of jurisdictional claims, and by targeting a domestically rooted affiliate, states can bring the global practices of the multinational corporation in line with their interests. In other words, states can take advantage of the transnationalization of the firm to transnationalize their authority beyond traditional jurisdictional boundaries. We label this process “networked liabilities.” Specifically, the combination of a firm’s sunk costs and the country’s jurisdictional substitutability determines the ability of governments to exert demands on multinational corporations. A key contribution of the article is to better specify the relationship between mobility and authority and to illustrate that networked liabilities can further empower a variety of states beyond traditional economic powers like the US or the European Union. We further highlight when firms may curtail the authority of great powers. The growing reach of the regulatory state domestically, coupled with the transnationalization of the firm, creates an increasing number of tools for certain governments to engage in economic statecraft beyond their borders. Our findings, then, contribute to debates on business–government relations in a globalized world, the changing nature of political risk, and the deterritorialization of state authority.

States with large markets routinely compete with one another to shield domestic regulatory policies from global pressure, export their rules to other jurisdictions, and provide their firms with competitive advantages. Most arguments about market power tend to operationalize the concept in economic terms. In this paper, we argue that a state's ability to leverage or block these adjustment pressures is not only conditioned by their relative economic position but also by the political institutions that govern their markets. Specifically, we expect that where a state chooses to draw jurisdictional boundaries over markets directly shapes its global influence. When a state expands its jurisdiction, harmonizing rules across otherwise distinct subnational or national markets, for example, it can curtail a rival's authority. We test the theory by assessing how changes in internal governance within the European Union altered firm behavior in response to US extraterritorial pressure. Empirically, we examine foreign firm delisting decisions from US stock markets after the adoption of the Sarbanes–Oxley accounting legislation. The act, which included an exogenous compliance shock, follows the harmonization of stock market governance across various European jurisdictions. Econometric analysis of firm-level data illustrates that EU-based companies, which benefited from jurisdictional expansion, were substantially more likely to leave the American market and avoid adjustment pressures. Our findings contribute to debates on the role of political institutions in economic statecraft and suggest the conditions under which future regulatory conflicts will arise between status quo and rising economic powers.

This article revisits the relationship between law and international order. Building on legal research concerned with transnational law, we argue that domestic courts are endogenous sites of international political change. National courts are constitutive of international order by generating new rules, adjudicating transnational disputes, and bounding state sovereignty. We illustrate the ways in which national courts create new political opportunities by updating three core international relations theory debates. Recognizing the role of domestic courts as global adjudicators enhances our understanding of regime complexity and international forum shopping. By re-interpreting aspects of conventional international law, and engaging in cross-border dialogue, domestic courts challenge our understanding of international diffusion and judicialization. By redefining the boundaries of state authority and sovereignty, national courts create potential for conflict and cooperation. A transnational law perspective illustrates the porous nature between domestic and international spheres, highlighting how domestic courts have become adjudicators for state and non-state actors that operate across mainstream levels of analysis. Our approach calls on scholars to move beyond analyzing national legal systems as mechanisms of compliance to instead consider domestic courts as co-creators of international order.