The Caucasus has always been a formative region for Russian foreign policy-making. While the North Caucasus has retained its position as Russia’s most fragile and politically instable region, the South Caucasus provided the most pressing security challenges shaping Russian foreign policy since the early nineteenth century. In this article, we argue that the Caucasus comprises a distinct environment that exposes the underlying features of the Russian grand strategy, namely its propensity to hard power and balancing, and yet, at the same time, the fragility of Russia’s position within such a turbulent region. The historical strategic equation with Turkey and Iran has in recent decades been supplemented with a competitive Russia-NATO security dynamic in the Black sea. The threat of possible NATO enlargement in the South Caucasus forces Moscow to draw particular attention to the southern direction of its defences. The situation has become even more complicated with the onset of the Ukraine crisis and Russian engagement in Syria. Historical experience teaches Russia to cease any other foreign policy endeavours until the Caucasus is at peace or at least does not threaten a spill-over of instability. For now, this is a very distant prospect.

Since the early 1980s, American scholarly and analytical literature has discussed the effectiveness of Soviet, and subsequently Russian, management of low-intensity conflicts. Though both the Soviet and Russian experience has been examined from many perspectives, including the military, economic, social and political, the American academic community does not tend to deem such an approach relevant and useful in terms of understanding US foreign policy. This disjoint is even harder to understand given the fact that the American military faced the same problems in Afghanistan and Iraq as the Soviet army experienced in Afghanistan (1979–1989), and Russian forces experienced during the First Chechen War (1994–1996). The greatest perplexity for American authors was the ability of Soviet and Russian leaders to recreate a power hierarchy on the ground while relying on their former adversaries – the Afghan Mujahideen and Chechen separatists. According to American intellectual discourse, reliance on a former enemy cannot be considered, by definition, during post-conflict state-building. Since the condition of the Russian conflict settlement model was pragmatism that is opposite to normative approach of the American policies in conflicts, this experience was not in demand in American foreign policy practice. The number of works by American scholars that include the comparison between the Soviet/Russian and the US campaigns is significantly smaller than the number of papers focusing on Soviet and Russian conduct, let alone their experience of nation-building. The aim of this study is to analyse American academic discourse about the Soviet/Russian experience of conducting low intensity conflicts. In the first part, the authors analyse the key mistakes of the Russian leadership during the campaigns, according to the estimates given by American researchers; the second part examines Russian strategy and its conflict settlement drawing comparison with the American experience. The authors conclude that US adaptation on the basis of Russian experiences in Afghanistan and Chechnya has proved impossible due to normative imperatives dominating American academic papers and policies. These imperatives bind the conflict resolution with the level of sophistication of a given country’s institutions. Perhaps, the vice versa claim could have grounds, yet it exceeds the limits of this study.

No abstract

We revisit and empirically evaluate crucial yet under-examined arguments articulated in “God Gave Physics the Easy Problems” (2000), the authors of which emphasized that, in International Relations (IR) predictions, predominant nomothetic approaches should be supplemented with concrete scenario thinking. We test whether the IR predictive toolkit is in fact dominated by nomothetic generalizations and, more broadly, map the methodological profile of this subfield. We build on the TRIP database, supplementing it with extensive original coding to operationalize the nuances of predictive research. In particular, we differentiate between nomoscopic predictions (predictive generalizations) and idioscopic predictions (predictions for concrete situations), showing that this distinction is not reducible to other methodological cleavages. We find that even though in contemporary IR an increasing number of articles seek to provide predictions, they consistently avoid predictions about concrete situations. The proportion of idioscopic predictions is stably small, with an even smaller proportion of predictions that develop concrete narratives or specify any determinate time period. Furthermore, those idioscopic studies are mostly limited to a niche with specialized themes and aims. Thus, our research shows that the critical claims from 20 years ago are still relevant for contemporary IR, as the “difficult problem” of developing predictive scenarios is still consistently overlooked in favor of other objectives. Ultimately, the types of predictions that IR scholars develop depend on their specific aims and constraints, but the discipline-wide result is a situation in which international studies’ ambition to provide predictions grows, but they tend to reproduce the same limitations as they did in 2000.

No abstract