Abstract:In this paper we are concerned with what explains public acceptance and support of environmental taxes. We examine findings in environmental psychology emphasizing that people's (environmental) value-orientation is the dominant driver determining individuals' support for pro-environmental policy instruments. We introduce a complementary model, mainly drawing upon findings in political science, suggesting that people's support for policy instruments is dependent on their level of political trust and their trust in other citizens. More specifically, we analyze whether political trust and interpersonal trust affect individuals' support for an increased carbon dioxide tax in Sweden, while checking their value orientation, self-interest, and various socio-economic values. We make use of survey data obtained from a mail questionnaire sent out to a random sample of 3,000 individuals in 2009. We find that apart from people's values, beliefs, and norms, both political trust and interpersonal trust have significant effects on people's attitudes toward an increased tax on carbon dioxide.

Highlights Country variations in COVID-19 policy interventions are understood by applying collective action theory. Through comparison with other large-scale collective action problems, insights on COVID-19 policies are gained. Reciprocal trust is a relevant factor when analyzing policy responses to the pandemic worldwide.

Public acceptance is a precondition for implementing taxes and laws aimed at mitigating climate change. However, it still remains challenging to understand its determinants for the climate community. Here, we use a meta-analytic approach to examine the role of public opinion about climate change taxes and laws. Fifteen variables were examined by synthesizing 89 datasets from 51 articles across 33 countries, with a total sample of 119,465 participants. Among all factors, perceived fairness and effectiveness were the most important determinants. Self-enhancement values and knowledge about climate change showed weak relationships and demographic variables showed only weak or close to zero effects. Our meta-analytic results provide useful insights and have the potential to inform climate change researchers, practitioners and policymakers to better design climate policy instruments.

Objective This study investigates, from a cross‐national perspective, the determinants of public willingness to make economic sacrifices for environmental protection. Departing from the argument that corrupt institutions diminish the potential for social cooperation, it argues that earlier studies fail to stress the effect of corruption and political trust on people's attitudes. Methods A multilevel regression analysis is performed using data from the International Social Survey Programme. Results The study shows that the willingness to make economic sacrifices for environmental protection is affected by individual political trust while it is hard to actually disentangle any contextual effects of corruption from other contextual effects. Conclusion Acknowledging the effects of political trust and corruption improves the discussion on country differences in willingness to make economic sacrifices for environmental protection.

The phenomenon of collective action and the origin of collective action problems have been extensively and systematically studied in the social sciences. Yet, while we have substantial knowledge about the factors promoting collective action at the local level, we know far less about how these insights travel to large-scale collective action problems. Such problems, however, are at the heart of humanity's most pressing challenges, including climate change, large-scale natural resource depletion, biodiversity loss, nuclear proliferation, antibiotic resistance due to overconsumption of antibiotics, and pollution. In this paper, we suggest an analytical framework that captures the theoretical understanding of preconditions for largescale collective action. This analytical framework aims at supporting future empirical analyses of how to cope with and overcome larger-scale collective action problems. More specifically, we (i) define and describe the main characteristics of a large-scale collective action problem and (ii) explain why voluntary and, in particular, spontaneous large-scale collective action among individual actors becomes more improbable as the collective action problem becomes larger, thus demanding interventions by an external authority (a third party) for such action to be generated. Based on this, we (iii) outline an analytical framework that illustrates the connection between third-party interventions and largescale collective action. We conclude by suggesting avenues for future research.