Constitutional culture, Mental models, Constitutional political economy, Constitutional maintenance, Informal institutions, B52, B53, F59, 043, P48, Z13,

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Purpose Subsequent to the First World War, the French Government regulated the Champagne industry, and locked the status of protected (and excluded) grapes into the new Appellation d’Origine Contrôlée system, forever altering the incentives and output of wine producers. The paper aims to discuss these issues. Design/methodology/approach As a result, some indigenous varietals have disappeared entirely from the region – and a handful remain only in the vineyards and bottles of a few bold entrepreneurs, constituting less than 1 percent of Champagne production. Findings The authors assess several traditional explanations (from taste and preferences to agricultural resilience)-and dismiss them as unconvincing. Instead, the authors adopt a public choice framework of regulatory capture to explain the puzzle of thwarted entrepreneurship and consumer choice. Originality/value This paper is original.

A country's constitutional order will have a strong impact on political stability and economic performance. In order for a formal constitution to stick, it must match the underlying constitutional culture. If the two are slightly mismatched, compromise will follow, in the form of constitutional change. If the two are radically mismatched, the informal (culture) will reject the formal (parchment), and with it, constitutionalism itself. This paper uses the case of post‐war constitutional choice in Japan and the Philippines to illustrate the theory. Both countries adopted similar, US‐influenced constitutions, under Allied military occupation. The Japanese constitution matched the underlying constitutional culture and stuck, leading to stability and growth. The Filipino constitution, on the other hand, did not match the underlying culture, and was rejected, leading to dictatorship and economic stagnation.