The purpose of this paper is to perform a detailed examination of corruption effects on trade based on corruption characteristics known to affect economic exchange within the corruption research field. These characteristics are the level, prevalence, customs location, function and predictability of corruption. The multifaceted corruption impact on trade is empirically examined using a corruption‐augmented gravity equation. The equation is estimated using a Heckman version of a GMM instrumental variable method. Our results provide strong evidence of that import flows vary systematically with the investigated corruption characteristics and enable the identification of channels through which corruption affects international trade. The empirical investigation clearly indicates the need to examine the multifaceted role of corruption to properly assess the trade effects of corruption.

There is stark evidence that many policies which influence firm gains from engaging in FDI (such as tax and trade policies) are targeted by lobbying groups and that corruption can be an important determinant of market attractiveness. The scarce research that exists on firm behaviour, corruption and lobbying shows that these activities can be regarded as alternative, and interdependent, influence forms. This paper provides the novel contribution of investigating how the market infiltration of corruption and lobbying affects the firm's investment decision. We identify the interdependent effects using census data for Swedish manufacturing firms that allows a complete identification of the firm's market selection. Our results reveal that these private–public sector links influence the firm's investment decision differently, as market selection is deterred by corruption and stimulated by lobbying, and that they function as substitutes. We show that the stimulating lobbying effect largely can be attributed to its interdependency with corruption, which suggests that firms are more shielded from corruption in lobbying environments. Further investigation reveals that the corruption and lobbying effects are not always representative of larger firms: The largest firms are undeterred by corruption in markets where lobbying forms an integral part of the business environment and larger firms are not stimulated by lobbying in markets largely void of corruption.