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This paper analyzes the empirical link between asset prices, consumption and the trade balance using a global macroeconometric model developed by Pesaran, Schuermann, and Weiner (2004). The model is estimated for 29 countries with quarterly data over the period 1981Q1 -2006Q4. Motivated by increasing international financial and real integration, and pronounced cycles in stock and housing prices, we employ generalized impulse response functions for a group of five of the world's most industrialized countries and show that shocks to asset prices transmit into consumption decisions and subsequently into the trade balance. We refer to this transmission channel as the international wealth effect and find it to be present in the US, UK and, to a lesser extent, in France, but absent in Japan and Germany.JEL Classification: E21, F15, F41, G15

This article investigates empirically whether shocks to asset prices transmit into the trade balance through consumption and investment for a group of five of the world's most industrialized countries. We refer to this transmission channel as the international wealth channel and estimate a GVAR model including 29 countries with quarterly data over the period 1981Q1-2006Q4. Generalized impulse response functions show that after a negative stock price shock US and UK consumption decreases, followed by an improving trade balance. This pattern is also visible for France, but not for Germany and Japan. Stock price decreases are only associated with decreasing investment and an improving trade balance in the UK. For housing, we do find that a negative shock to UK housing prices decreases domestic investment and improves the trade balance. However, this pattern is not visible in the other countries. Finally, a domestic negative real exchange rate shock only has a significantly positive impact on the US trade balance.

Recent empirical work has shown that ongoing international financial integration facilitates cross-country consumption risk-sharing. These studies typically find that countries with high equity home bias exhibit relatively low international consumption risk sharing. We extend this line of research and demonstrate that it is not only a country's equity home bias that prevents consumption risk sharing. In addition, the composition of a country's foreign asset portfolio plays an important role. Using panel-data regression for a group of OECD countries over the period 1980-2007, we show that foreign investment bias has additional explanatory power for consumption risk sharing.

Recent empirical work has shown that ongoing international financial integration facilitates cross-country consumption risk-sharing. These studies typically find that countries with high equity home bias exhibit relatively low international consumption risk sharing. We extend this line of research and demonstrate that it is not only a country's equity home bias that prevents consumption risk sharing. In addition, the composition of a country's foreign asset portfolio plays an important role. Using panel-data regression for a group of OECD countries over the period 1980-2007, we show that foreign investment bias has additional explanatory power for consumption risk sharing.