We discuss the findings of an analysis of cognitive orientation of 4,953 mathematical tasks (representing all bookwork, worksheets, and exams) used by five instructors teaching Calculus I in a two-year college in the United States over a one-semester period. This study uses data from one of 18 cases from the Characteristics of Successful Programs in College Calculus (CSPCC) and characterizes the tasks using and adaptation of an analytical framework developed by Tallman & Carlson (2012). We found differences in the cognitive orientation by type of course work assigned (graded vs. ungraded) and differences by the instructors who assigned the course work. We discuss implications for practice and propose some areas for further exploration

Fixing constants ε and c, we consider the class of all closed ε‐thick hyperbolic 3‐manifolds M such that π1(M) can be generated by c elements. For all k, we prove that λk(M) ∼ vol−2(M) up to a multiplicative constant depending only on ε, c, and k, where λk(M) is the kth eigenvalue of the Laplace–Beltrami operator.

In this article, we discuss issues to consider when using learning goals to strategically select applets from a large public database and some pitfalls to avoid, namely being aware of error-prone applets.

<p>Section 14 of the Bill of Rights Act extends to protect internet access within New Zealand as a means of expression. Judicial restriction of internet access via the imposition of special conditions during sentencing is therefore an infringement of s 14. This interpretation of s 14 is consistent with its purpose, legislative history, and the broad approach afforded to human rights generally, as well as international case law and statutes. Any imposition of special conditions restricting internet access must be a demonstrably justifiable limit per s 5 of the Bill of Rights Act to be legitimate. The practical considerations of such a technological limit also warrant judicial consideration before it is imposed. As yet, New Zealand has no explicit protection of internet access but growing acceptance of its importance indicates that reform or judicial acknowledgement are, or soon will be, required.</p>

<p>Section 14 of the Bill of Rights Act extends to protect internet access within New Zealand as a means of expression. Judicial restriction of internet access via the imposition of special conditions during sentencing is therefore an infringement of s 14. This interpretation of s 14 is consistent with its purpose, legislative history, and the broad approach afforded to human rights generally, as well as international case law and statutes. Any imposition of special conditions restricting internet access must be a demonstrably justifiable limit per s 5 of the Bill of Rights Act to be legitimate. The practical considerations of such a technological limit also warrant judicial consideration before it is imposed. As yet, New Zealand has no explicit protection of internet access but growing acceptance of its importance indicates that reform or judicial acknowledgement are, or soon will be, required.</p>