Distribution of farmers by dead animal disposal methods, broiler production, 2003 (percent) 6.8 Distribution of farmers by dead animal disposal methods, egg production, 2003 (percent) 6.9 Distribution of farmers by dead animal disposal methods, swine production, 2003 (percent) 6.10 Environmental expenditures per kilogram output of liveweight broiler or eggs from poultry production, 2003 6.11 Environmental expenditures per kilogram output from swine production, 2003 6.12 Environmental expenditures per unit output from milk production, 2003 6.13 Determinants of farm expenditure on mitigation of environmental externalities from swine production, Thailand, 2002-03 6.14 Determinants of farm expenditure on mitigation of environmental externalities from broiler production, Thailand, 2003 6.15 Determinants of farm expenditure on mitigation of environmental externalities from broiler production, Philippines, 2002-03 6.16 Determinants of farm expenditure on mitigation of environmental externalities from swine production, Philippines, 2002-03 7.1 Mean relative profit efficiency of broiler farms across farm sizes by country, 2002 7.2 Mean relative profit efficiency of layer farms across farm sizes by country, 2002 7.3 Mean relative profit efficiency of swine farms across farm sizes by country, 2002 7.4 Mean relative profit efficiency of dairy farms across farm sizes by country, 2002 7.5 Parameter estimates of stochastic profit frontier and determinants of profit inefficiency on Philippine broiler farms 7.6 Parameter estimates of stochastic profit frontier and determinants of profit inefficiency on Thai broiler farms 7.7 Parameter estimates of stochastic profit frontier and determinants of profit inefficiency on Indian broiler farms 7.8 Parameter estimates of stochastic profit frontier and determinants of profit inefficiency on Brazilian layer farms 7.9 Parameter estimates of stochastic profit frontier and determinants of profit inefficiency on Indian layer farms 7.10 Parameter estimates of stochastic profit frontier and determinants of profit inefficiency on Philippine swine farms tables v 7.11 Parameter estimates of stochastic profit frontier and determinants of profit inefficiency on Brazilian swine farms 7.12 Parameter estimates of stochastic profit frontier and determinants of profit inefficiency on Indian dairy farms 7.13 Parameter estimates of stochastic profit frontier and determinants of profit inefficiency on Thai dairy farms 7.14 Parameter estimates of stochastic profit frontier and determinants of profit inefficiency on Brazilian dairy farms 7.15 Summary of empirical results vi tables summary xi xii summary 3 Monogastrics are animals with one stomach compartment; examples are pigs and poultry. settled export-certified zone spend more per unit than smaller farms, and dairy farmers in Thailand, where the larger-scale farmers have more crop land per animal than do the smallerscale farmers in the sample. Results are backed up by a second, more conventional procedure that estimates mass balances of nutrients per hectar...

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This paper examines determinants of investments in and returns to training with focus on technical changes using employee panel data in Thai manufacturing industries. Empirical findings demonstrate significant returns to both on-the-job and off-the-job training in first-difference fixed effect estimation of wage equations, controlling for technical changes which differentially influence training investments and the returns. First, returns to informal on-the-job training are robust, contrary to findings from developed countries. Second, technical change induces both on-the-job and off-the-job training, and controlling for technical change makes returns to on-the-job training even larger. Implications for training and education policies are discussed.

The paper assesses the benefits and costs of the Thai paddy pledging policy between October 2011 and May 2014. The scheme, which purchased 52 percent of total paddy production from the farmers, was to date the largest intervention by the government in the rice market. Its total costs were 984 billion baht (or 41% of the 2013 fiscal budget). The government also became the largest rice seller, trying unsuccessfully to corner the export market by withholding large supplies of rice from the market. Thai rice export dropped sharply as the export prices of Thai rice were much higher than those of India and Vietnam which toppled Thailand from the world largest exporter position. The attempt to release rice through the channel of Government‐to‐government sales failed. But the government refused to admit its failure and kept all rice sale information in secret. In fact, most of the claimed G‐to‐G sales were sold to the connected traders who in turn sold them in the domestic market. The policy directly benefited at least one third of the rice farmers who sold rice to the government. Other non‐participating farmers also benefited from the higher domestic price. Yet most of the benefits went to the medium‐ and large‐scale farmers. Thai consumers also gained because the government maintained a smooth flow of rice in the domestic market at the prices prevailing at the end of the previous government, despite higher paddy price. The study also finds that there was corruption in the government rice sale as it sold rice to a few connected traders at the prices below the market prices. That explained why the fiscal loss is estimated at 595 billion baht to 885 billion baht, depending on the time it will take to dispose 18 million tons of rice in the government stock. The policy also creates other social costs. Thus the social costs exceeded its benefits.

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