In the current study, the authors explored how CEO greed concerning bonuses and rewards on restricted stock affects a firm's environmental performance (EP) in environmentally sensitive sectors of China. Moreover, they empirically tested the constraining role of the quad director on the relationship between CEO greed and EP. Findings indicate that (a) CEO greed negatively affects the strategic firm's environmental performance, particularly the negative relation is augmented by the person-pay interactionism rationale (bonus), (b) the presence of one quad director in the board does not constrain CEO greed and EP negative relation, and (c) the presence of two or more quad directors in the board significantly constraints the negative relation between CEO greed and EP. Thus, having at least two quad directors is more effective than combining directors with multiple features. Our results are robust to different CEOs' power dynamics. Our research has important practical implications for corporate governance and business strategy formulation.

This article investigated the determinants of the firm’s earnings quality (FREQ) using panel data of Egyptian listed firms to address the concerns of endogeneity and heterogeneity. We found that CEO power dynamics negatively impact FREQ. Furthermore, corporate governance’s weakening or substitution role is investigated for the negative association between CEO power dynamics and FREQ. Our findings showed that board-independence significantly weakens the impacts of CEO- ownership and CEO-tenure on FREQ. In contrast, the results fail to support the weakening or substitution role of board-independence for the negative effects of CEO-duality and CEO-political connection on FREQ. Board gender diversity is not significantly associated with FREQ. However, we found that the presence of gender critical mass serves as a substitution mechanism for the negative association between CEO power dynamics and FREQ. Lastly, we observed strong robustness for our primary analysis through propensity matching scores and difference-in-different (DID) techniques. This study brings a novelty to existing research by exploring the negative consequences of CEO power dynamics. Furthermore, it provides an insight into the constraining or weakening of the role of corporate governance. The main findings of the current study are also robust to Modified Jones model (1995) reverse-causality, DID and propensity-matching techniques.

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PurposeThe authors examine the spillover effects of CEO removal on the corporate financial policies of competing firms among S&P 1500 firms.Design/methodology/approachThe authors used generalized estimating equations (GEE) on a sample of S&P 1,500 firms from 2000 to 2018 to test this study's research hypotheses. Return on assets (ROA), investment policy, and payout policy are used as proxies for corporate policies.FindingsThe authors found an increase in ROA and dividend payout in the immediate aftermath. Further, this study's hypothesis does not hold for R&D expenditure and net-working capital as the authors found an insignificant change in them in the immediate aftermath. However, the authors found a significant reduction in capital expenditure, supporting this study's hypothesis in the context of investment policy. Institutional investors and product similarity moderated the spillover effect on corporate policies (ROA, dividend payout, and capital expenditure).Originality/valueThe authors address a novel aspect of CEO performance-induced removal due to poor performance, i.e., the response of other CEOs to CEO performance-induced removal. This study's findings add to the literature supporting the bright side of CEOs' response to CEO performance-induced removal in peer firms due to poor performance.