Rats were given extensive training in a complicated appetitive maze. Following a retention interval of 7 days they were given a single electroconvulsive shock (ESC). Animals for which memory cues had been reinstated just prior to ECS were found to be more amnesic upon retest than animals whose memories had not been reinstated. Thus, amnesia can be produced for wellestablished memories if the memory cues are present at the time the amnesic agent occurs.The gradient of amnesia as a function of the learning-ECS interval has long been a primary bulwark supporting the consolidation theory (Dawson, 1971;McGaugh, 1966). According to this theory, the younger the engram the more susceptible it is to disruption, and, in time, the engram consolidates to the point that it can no longer be disrupted. Another interpretation for this gradient has been proposed by Misanin, Miller, and Lewis (1968). They argued that memory recency was the important variable rather than the age of the engram. When a memory is active, or at least in a transition phase from being passive to being active, it is most open to blocking, and therefore ECS will produce an amnestic gradient. To support their notion that ECS is a blocker of active memories rather than a disrupter of labile new memories, they demonstrated an amnesia for an older, well-consolidated memory that was active at the time ECS was presented. This is a form of "cue-dependent amnesia,"

The purpose of the present experiment was to test the impact of two types of nonidentification information (eyewitness testimony and fingerprint evidence) on the perception of guilt. Subjects simulating the role of jurors were shown cases in which there was (were): (a) a single eyewitness identification, (b) a single eyewitness nonidentification, (c) a single eyewitness control, (d) contradictory testimony, (e) two eyewitness identifications, or (f) two eyewitness nonidentifications. Three levels of fingerprint information (identification, nonidentification, and control) were factorially combined with the eyewitness factor. Results show that nonidentifications had less impact on perceptions of guilt than identification for both eyewitness testimony and fingerprint evidence. The results were explained in terms of the general tendency for negative information to carry greater weight than positive information.

The present research tested the impact of severity of sentence and probability of conviction on plea bargaining decisions made by prosecutors and defense attorneys. Hypothetical scenarios involving various criminal cases were mailed to two prosecutors and two defense attorneys in each of 47 states. Information was manipulated such that probability of conviction was either 20%, 50%, or 80%, and the severity of the sentence if the case went to trial was either 2 or 5 years. Prosecutors had to decide whether to offer a 1-year plea-bargain sentence whereas defense attorneys had to decide whether to accept such a sentence. Results show that as the severity of sentence and probability of conviction increased, prosecutors became less willing to plea bargain whereas defense attorneys became more willing. Also evident in the data was a prosecutor bias in favor of plea bargaining and a defense attorney bias in favor of trials.The vast majority of felony convictions are obtained through the process of plea bargaining (Blumberg, 1979), yet psychologists largely have ignored plea bargaining in favor of studying how juries function. As a consequence there is very little experimental evidence concerning the plea-bargaining decisions made by prosecutors and defense attorneys. There has been some very impressive nonexperimental research, however. In an ethnographic study of prosecutors and defense attorneys, Mather (1979) found that both prosecutors and defense attorneys based plea-bargaining decisions to a large extent on (a) the severity of sentence if the case were to go to trial and (b) the probability of conviction. Mather described in some detail the plea-bargaining dynamics of cases involving various combinations of the two variables. As is typical of this style of research, the description was handled in a fairly atheoretical manner, using specific cases to illustrate points. There was little concern with precise operational definitions; for example, probability of conviction was dichotomized into either "dead bang" (high probability of conviction) or "reasonable doubt" (some intermediate probability of conviction). While Mather's analysis is very thought provoking, one can look at the variables of probability of conviction and severity of sentence from a more theoretical perspective.Nagel and Neef (1979) applied decision theory's concept of expected value maximization to the plea-bargaining decisions The research reported here was supported in part by a faculty grant from Southeastern Louisiana University. Support was also given by the local chapter of Psi Chi. The author wishes to thank Carole McAllister for her editorial help and Bobbie Threeton for her clerical assistance. Thanks are also due to

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The impact of two types of eyewitness testimony on mock jurors' judgments was explored. A crime eyewitness either testified that the defendant definitely was the robber (identification), definitely was not the robber (nonidentification), or that they weren't sure if he was or was not the robber (control). An alibi eyewitness testified that the defendant either definitely was at the alibi location (identification), definitely was not at the alibi location (nonidentification), or he wasn't sure if the defendant was or was not at the alibi location (control). Strength of case was also manipulated. Results show that crime eyewitness identifications and alibi eyewitness nonidentifications were underutilized. A crime eyewitness by alibi eyewitness interaction revealed that within the crime eyewitness identification condition alibi identification was underutilized whereas with the other two crime eyewitness conditions, alibi nonidentification information was underutilized. The results supported a disconfirmed expectancy explanation.