SUMMARYMany production Grid and e-Science infrastructures have begun to offer services to end-users during the past several years with an increasing number of scientific applications that require access to a wide variety of resources and services in multiple Grids. Therefore, the Grid Interoperation Now-Community Group of the Open Grid Forum-organizes and manages interoperation efforts among those production Grid infrastructures to reach the goal of a world-wide Grid vision on a technical level in the near future. This contribution highlights fundamental approaches of the group and discusses open standards in the context of production e-Science infrastructures.

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Abstract-The security models used in Grid systems today strongly bear the marks of their diverse origin. Historically retrofitted to the distributed systems they are designed to protect and control, the security model is usually limited in scope and applicability, and its implementation tailored towards a few specific deployment scenarios. A common approach towards even the "basic" elements such as authentication to resources is only now emerging, whereas for more complex issues such as community organization, integration of site access control with operating systems, crossdomain resource provisioning, or overlay community Grids ("late authentication" for pilot job frameworks or communitybased virtual machines) there is no single coherent and consistent "security" view. Via this paper we aim to share some observations on current security models and solutions found in Grid architectures and deployments today and identify architectural limitations in solving complex access control and policy enforcement scenarios in distributed resource management. The paper provides a short overview of the OGSA security services and other security solutions used in Grid middleware and operations practice. However, it is becoming clear that further development in Grid requires a fresh look at the concepts, both operationally and securitywise. This paper analyses the security aspects of different types of Grids and a set of use cases that may require extended security functionality, such as dynamic security context management, and management of stateful services. Recent developments in open systems security, and revisiting basic security concepts in networking and computing including the OSI Security Architecture and the concepts used in the Trusted Computing Base provide interesting examples on how some of the conceptual security problems in Grid can be addressed, and on how the shortcomings of current systems and the frequently proposed "ad-hoc" stop-gaps for what are in fact complex security manageability problems may be avoided. This paper is thus intended to initiate and stimulate the wider discussion on the concepts of Grid security, thereby setting the scene for and providing input to a Grid security taxonomy leading to a more consistent Grid Security Architecture.

We present a framework for the co-ordinated, autonomic management of multiple clusters in a compute center and their integration into a Grid environment. Site autonomy and the automation of administrative tasks are prime aspects in this framework. The system behavior is continuously monitored in a steering cycle and appropriate actions are taken to resolve any problems.All presented components have been implemented in the course of the EU project DataGrid: The Lemon monitoring components, the FT fault-tolerance mechanism, the quattor system for software installation and configuration, the RMS job and resource management system, and the Gridification scheme that integrates clusters into the Grid.