This paper characterizes the structure of monetary incentives with varying agent incentive-consciousness. Incentive consciousness arises when the valuation of incentive among agents differs with situations. Using a moral hazard framework with limited liability we show that for agents with low outside option optimal incentive pay is independent of incentive-consciousness whereas for agents with high outside option increased incentive-consciousness leads to increased incentive payment. For agents with very high incentive-consciousness such that the limited liability does not bind, an exogenous increase in incentive-consciousness leads to an unambiguous decrease in optimal incentive payment. Thus, the paper provides a non-monotonic relation between incentive consciousness and optimal incentive pay. With incentive-consciousness, inefficiency in the effort will exist with risk-neutral principal and agent even in the absence of limited liability. This runs contrary to standard incentive theory.

PurposeElectric street car (ESC) is a globally popular clean and safe electric transport system for urban agglomeration. India envisions achieving “all-electric transport” by 2030, yet ESC as a modal transport alternative is not distinct in the policy discussion. The emerging market for electric transportation in urban spaces requires a detailed demand study at the service user level to remove behavioural barriers and design integrated energy planning in developing economies. This paper explores the probabilistic uptake intentions of the daily public transport commuters for ESCs over e-buses from the only Indian city with operational ESCs, Kolkata.Design/methodology/approachUsing a random utility model on primary survey data from daily commuters, the authors identify demographic, psychometric and socio-economic factors influencing probabilistic uptake of ESC over e-buses.FindingsIt estimates that 38% of the commuters demand ESC over e-buses, given the alternatives' comparative details. Factors like frequent availability and technological upgradation would increase the uptake of ESCs.Social implicationsThe study highlights that even though there are infrastructural challenges in the implementation of ESC, so does any other electric transport system; it is worth considering as a decarbonising transport alternative, given the high up-take intension of the users.Originality/valueThis is the first attempt to study the demand for ESC in developing economies, identifying the factors which may be considered in the sustainable urban transportation policy perspective.

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The article identifies the condition under which it is beneficial for the principal to be a lenient performance evaluator towards his/her favourite agent. It provides the game theoretic foundation behind the decision of choosing leniency (biased) over stringency (fair). The emergence of an influential literature captures the different aspects of status as a non-monetary incentive and its significance in organisational theory. However, the interplay between status and evaluation system has not been studied much. The article is built over an article by Dey and Banerjee (2014a) to understand the role of status incentive with the leniency of evaluation. Analysis of the interplay between status and leniency shows that when status is valued more, the principal benefits from this form of biasness. Interestingly, this article also provides a linkage between informativeness of output signal with this form of biasness. Using moral hazard framework with limited liability in a discrete effort framework, it is suggested that a weak output signal can act as an instrument in reducing the emergence of a lenient evaluation.