Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. Abstract Gender di¤erences in preferences regarding social relationships and competitive environments are well documented in psychology and economics. Research also shows that social relationships and competition among co-workers are a¤ected by the incentive schemes workers are exposed to. We combine these two stylized facts and hypothesize that men and women di¤er in how they rate their co-worker relationships when they work under individual incentives, group incentives, or a combination of the two. This hypothesis is explored using survey data on 14,743 highly educated employees from 78 di¤erent organizations in the Netherlands. We …nd correlational evidence that, in the absence of individual incentives, group incentives improve co-worker relationships for women, but deteriorate co-worker relationships for men. Terms of use: Documents in

We conduct a …eld experiment in a Dutch retail chain with 122 stores to study the interaction between team incentives, team social cohesion, and team performance.Theory predicts that the e¤ect of team incentives on team performance depends on a team's social cohesion. In particular, free-riding should be weaker when co-workers care more about each other. Conversely, team incentives may lead to more co-worker support or to higher peer pressure and thereby can a¤ect the team's social cohesion.We introduce short-term team incentives in a randomly selected subset of stores and measure for all stores, both before and after the intervention, the team's sales performance, the team's social cohesion as well as co-worker support and peer pressure. The average treatment e¤ect of the team incentive on sales is 1.5 percentage points, which does not di¤er signi…cantly from zero. In line with theory, the estimated treatment e¤ect strongly increases in social cohesion as measured before the intervention. We …nd that social cohesion itself is not a¤ected by the team incentives. Our study illustrates the potential of complementing a …eld experiment with ex ante and ex post questionnaire data collection for the study of management practices, workplace behavior, and performance.

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