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The International Studies in Education program at the University of Iceland illustrates how one university is responding to global trends in higher education. Through a case study we examined the significance of an innovative B.A. program, which is taught in English, aligned with values affirmed in critical multiculturalist scholarship, and designed to respond to demographic changes including a sharp increase in Iceland's immigrant population. The experience of students, teachers, and administrators raises important questions about institutional responsibilities, both local and global; about the role of Innov High Educ (2011) 36:125-139 English in an international studies program; about de facto segregation of students; and about the significance of local context in global trends in higher education.

The focus within the European tradition of democratic education has increasingly been on personal traits or character traits, values, and skills, rather than on broad structural features or systemic issues. This is reflected in a recent publication by the Council of Europe titled Competences for Democratic Culture: Living Together as Equals in Culturally Diverse Democratic Societies. In that publication relevant character traits are grouped under the heading ‘competences for democratic culture’. We scrutinize the notion of ‘democratic competences’ which is developed in the publication and suggest a different one. The Council of Europe presents a model with 20 competences, each of which falls into one of four categories: (1) a value, (2) an attitude, (3) a skill, or (4) knowledge and understanding. We suggest a notion of competences where a competence is conceived of as a complex construct composed of elements from all these categories. We then describe seven democratic competences, grounded in a Deweyan conception of democracy, which we think are both central to a democratic culture while also educationally relevant and manageable.

It is widely accepted that vagueness in law calls for a specific interpretation of the law-interpretation that changes the meaning of the law and makes it more precise. According to this view, vagueness causes gaps in the law, and the role of legal interpretation in the case of vagueness is to fill such gaps. I argue that this view is mistaken and defend the thesis that vagueness in law calls only for an application of the law to the case at hand, leaving the meaning of the law intact.

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