The purpose of this article is to discuss how pupils' exposure to religious and life-stance diversity should be organized through the formal curriculum of public education in order to best foster tolerance. The article examines 2 proposals: the integrated French model and the Norwegian religious education model. In view of normative considerations and considerations of effectiveness, it argues that, although each model has its merits, they are both problematic because they, in different ways, fail to adequately balance the need for relevant exposure to religious and life-stance diversity with sufficient neutrality. By taking the Norwegian model as a point of departure, the article concludes by proposing 2 improvements: one calling for a sufficiently neutral value basis, and the other for a more mindful use of educational methods.

There has recently been an increasing focus on the inclusion of nonreligious world-views in religious education (RE). An important concern for the legitimacy of an RE subject in public education in liberal democracies is that all traditions, whether religious or secular, are treated in an equal and inclusive manner. This article examines the Norwegian case, where secular worldviews have been integrated as a central part of the compulsory national curriculum in RE for over 20 years. It does so by considering how the history of secular humanism is constructed in Norwegian RE textbooks. Theoretically, the article draws on the postmodern historiographic critique presented by Hayden White. A central concept is emplotment and the idea that emplotments convey moral arguments. Three narratives-'rationality', 'humanity' and 'rights and democracy'are identified as the core of the history of secular humanism being told in the material. The article suggests that the way these narratives are emplotted grants secular humanism a privileged position and that the fair and balanced representation of worldviews in RE education calls for alternative emplotments of this history.

The article considers whether tolerance, in the classical liberal sense, should be promoted in public education. The most substantial counter-argument is that it is problematic to uphold the 'objection condition,' explained below, which is an integral part of classical tolerance, while maintaining tolerance as a virtue. As a response to this, I first discuss an alternative interpretation of tolerance -'tolerance as being open-minded, unprejudiced and positive towards difference.' I contend that this understanding is not the preferable one in public education, because it lacks sufficient distinctiveness and threatens to marginalize or exclude the classical concept of tolerance. I instead propose a modified version of classical tolerance to be promoted in public education, whereby permissible objections are restricted so as not to disrespect persons. This version allows, however, for pupils to have a wide range of objections while still being candidates for being called tolerant, with the result that promoting tolerance may clash with other important educational objectives. I argue that promoting tolerance is still needed as part of a robust educational approach to plurality in modern democratic states, but that we must be willing to accept that promoting tolerance sometimes assumes the place of a second-best educational alternative.

No abstract

No abstract