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This article analyzes the role of ressentiment in the long-term historical process of Russia’s collective self-identification vis-à-vis “the West”. It argues that ressentiment was persistently generated by the structure of this relationship as long as Russia’s aspiration for an equal status continually proved to be unrealistic. This induced different discursive strategies that are described by social identity theory (SIT) as social mobility, social creativity and social competition. As a motivating factor for the development of these strategies, on the one hand, and a recurrent consequence of their invalidity on the other, ressentiment became a considerable driving force of discourse about Russian identity.

This article traces the reinterpretation of the Revolution(s) of 1917 in the official historical narrative of post-Soviet Russia. Its construction is an essentially political process, as its discursive hegemony depends on how it fits into the symbolic landscape created by various social actors. The task of reinterpretation of the revolution is complicated by its centrality for two conflicting patterns of memory politics-the critical "working through" the memory of a traumatic and criminal past, and consolidation of the nation/nation-building. There are different coalitions of mnemonic actors behind each of these patterns. The author reveals different strategies of dealing with dilemmas involved in employing these patterns in the 1990s and the 2000s, and argues that until now the Russian imcumbent elites have not succeeded in reframing the Russian Revolution as a great, though tragic, episode of the national past. In the context of the centenary commemorated in 2017, the incumbent elite seem to have come back to the idea of "reconciliation and accord" that was coined by Boris Yeltsin' s team in the mid-1990s. However, its integration into the apologetic narrative of "the 1000-year Russian state" totally changes its meaning, as it rejects "working through" the traumatic past.

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