Background Three clusters of coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) linked to a tour group from China, a company conference, and a church were identified in Singapore in February, 2020.Methods We gathered epidemiological and clinical data from individuals with confirmed COVID-19, via interviews and inpatient medical records, and we did field investigations to assess interactions and possible modes of transmission of severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2). Open source reports were obtained for overseas cases. We reported the median (IQR) incubation period of SARS-CoV-2. Findings As of Feb 15, 2020, 36 cases of COVID-19 were linked epidemiologically to the first three clusters of circumscribed local transmission in Singapore. 425 close contacts were quarantined. Direct or prolonged close contact was reported among affected individuals, although indirect transmission (eg, via fomites and shared food) could not be excluded. The median incubation period of SARS-CoV-2 was 4 days (IQR 3-6). The serial interval between transmission pairs ranged between 3 days and 8 days.Interpretation SARS-CoV-2 is transmissible in community settings, and local clusters of COVID-19 are expected in countries with high travel volume from China before the lockdown of Wuhan and institution of travel restrictions. Enhanced surveillance and contact tracing is essential to minimise the risk of widespread transmission in the community.Funding None. Articles 2www.thelancet.com Published online March 16, 2020 https://doi.

Situation Report-12 SITUATION IN NUMBERS total and new cases in last 24 hours Globally 11953 confirmed (2128 new) China 11821 confirmed (2102 new) 1795 severe (268 new) 259 deaths (46 new) Outside of China 132 confirmed (26 new) 23 countries (4 new) WHO RISK ASSESSMENT China Very High Regional Level High Global Level High *The situation report includes information reported to WHO Geneva by 10 AM Additional instances of human-to-human transmission outside China were reported (see further information under Technical Focus).

We conducted in-depth analysis on the use of a popular Chinese social networking and microblogging site, Sina Weibo, to monitor an avian influenza A(H7N9) outbreak in China and to assess the value of social networking sites in the surveillance of disease outbreaks that occur overseas. Two data sets were employed for our analysis: a line listing of confirmed cases obtained from conventional public health information channels and case information from Weibo posts. Our findings showed that the level of activity on Weibo corresponded with the number of new cases reported. In addition, the reporting of new cases on Weibo was significantly faster than those of conventional reporting sites and non-local news media. A qualitative review of the functions of Weibo also revealed that Weibo enabled timely monitoring of other outbreak-relevant information, provided access to additional crowd-sourced epidemiological information and was leveraged by the local government as an interactive platform for risk communication and monitoring public sentiment on the policy response. Our analysis demonstrated the potential for social networking sites to be used by public health agencies to enhance traditional communicable disease surveillance systems for the global surveillance of overseas public health threats. Social networking sites also can be used by governments for calibration of response policies and measures and for risk communication.

ObjectiveTo assess the public health risk to Singapore posed by the emergence of artemisinin-resistant (ART-R) malaria in the Greater Mekong Subregion (GMS).MethodsWe assessed the likelihood of importation of drug-resistant malaria into Singapore and the impact on public health of its subsequent secondary spread in Singapore. Literature on the epidemiology and contextual factors associated with ART-R malaria was reviewed. The epidemiology of malaria cases in Singapore was analysed. The vulnerability and receptivity of Singapore were examined, including the connectivity with countries reporting ART-R malaria, as well as the preparedness of Singaporean health authorities. Sources of information include international journals, World Health Organization guidelines, data from the Singapore Ministry of Health and National Public Health Laboratory of the National Centre for Infectious Diseases, and the International Air Transport Association.ResultsThe importation of ART-R malaria into Singapore is possible given the close proximity and significant travel volume between Singapore and the GMS countries reporting artemisinin resistance. Singapore’s vulnerability is further enhanced by the presence of foreign workers from neighbouring endemic countries. Nonetheless, the overall likelihood of such an event is low based on the rarity and decreasing trend of imported malaria incidence.​With the presence of Anopheles vectors in Singapore, imported cases of drug-resistant malaria could cause secondary transmission. Nevertheless, the risk of sustained spread is likely to be mitigated by the comprehensive surveillance and control system in place for both infected vectors and human cases.DiscussionThis risk assessment highlights the need for a continued high degree of vigilance of ART-R malaria locally and globally to minimize the risk and public health impact of drug-resistant malaria in Singapore.

Objective: To assess the public health risk to Singapore posed by the Middle East respiratory syndrome (MERS) outbreak in the Republic of Korea in 2015. Methods:The likelihood of importation of MERS cases and the magnitude of the public health impact in Singapore were assessed to determine overall risk. Literature on the epidemiology and contextual factors associated with MERS coronavirus infection was collected and reviewed. Connectivity between the Republic of Korea and Singapore was analysed. Public health measures implemented by the two countries were reviewed. Results: The epidemiology of the 2015 MERS outbreak in the Republic of Korea remained similar to the MERS outbreaks in Saudi Arabia. In addition, strong infection control and response measures were effective in controlling the outbreak. In view of the air traffic between Singapore and MERS-affected areas, importation of MERS cases into Singapore is possible. Nonetheless, the risk of a serious public health impact to Singapore in the event of an imported case of MERS would be mitigated by its strong health-care system and established infection control practices. Discussion: The MERS outbreak was sparked by an exported case from the Middle East, which remains a concern as the reservoir of infection (thought to be camels) continues to exist in the Middle East, and sporadic cases in the community and outbreaks in health-care settings continue to occur there. This risk assessment highlights the need for Singapore to stay vigilant and to continue enhancing core public health capacities to detect and respond to MERS coronavirus.