The article addresses the prospective responsibility of states to protect citizens from emigration pressures. After establishing the moral weight of the interest in staying, the article proceeds to explain why the interest to stay is comparatively more resistant to restrictions than the interest in exercising freedom of movement across borders. On this basis, the argument is then advanced that immigration fees can be charged on (well-off) immigrants as a means to protect economically vulnerable residents in recipient countries from emigration pressures. The argument that I will advance is in at least one sense non-consequentialist: it accounts for the need for immigration fees without relying on (problematic) assumptions about the consequences of immigration. Furthermore, the argument is also realistic in so far as it accepts that states have the right to restrict immigration.

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This article makes the normative case for a differentiated approach to the sovereignty of states over natural resources. In the first half of the article, drawing on the example of the Yasun ı-ITT-Initiative, I will argue that countries commit a moral wrong when they exploit natural resources for their own benefit (and to the detriment of the climate), but that they have the moral right to do so given the current structure of the international system. In the second half of the article, I address the question of whether states' rights over natural resources can be justified. Central to my argument will be the distinction between "control rights" and "income rights." Only control rights, I will argue, can be justified as inherently tied to collective self-determination.

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