Radicalisation of Muslim youth is a hot item in the Netherlands. Deradicalisation is therefore high on the agenda. In our view, however, the deradicalisation processes begin at a moment ‘when it is too late to lock the stable door, because the horse has already bolted’. That is why our focus is on the prevention of radicalisation. In our contribution, we explore the concept of ‘radicalisation’ and inform the reader about deradicalisation programmes developed in the Netherlands and in Europe. The lack of success of these programmes challenges us to focus on ‘prevention’. In our view, a playful dialogical encounter in a safe space is a must in the approach of young people who are on the verge of radicalisation. The above-mentioned concepts of radicalisation, deradicalisation and prevention are presented in the first paragraph, followed by a discussion of de- and counter-radicalisation programmes in paragraph two. The third paragraph focuses on the prevention of radicalisation in education. Crucial here is a dialogical relationship between teachers and students, between the students themselves and within the students’ inner selves. This latter aspect is inspired by the theoretical framework of the dialogical self-theory, with its core concept of ‘multi-voicedness’ and ‘positioning of voices’. Special attention in the positioning process is given to resilience. The heart of this publication is dedicated to the re-invention of an age-old Islamic game: shaṭranj al-ʿārifīn’. In the fourth paragraph, we describe its origins and our adapted version of this game. Playing the game in pilot studies—a ‘serious play session’—increases young people’s awareness of religion and its positioning, resulting in strengthening resilience in their life orientation. In the concluding fifth paragraph, we state that our innovative, playful and theoretically well-framed approach is a promising module to be implemented in formal and informal education.

Public debates in the Netherlands assume there is an inherent tension between the traditional task of the imam and his tasks in the secularized Dutch society. Studies of the effect of age and generation on religiosity report that intense religious changes are taking place among second-generation migrants. But the direction of this change is interpreted differently by scholars. A majority of scholars indicate that second-generation migrants consider themselves more 'Muslim' and are more concerned about the traditional sources of religious authority. Other studies report that there is an ongoing pattern of secularization among Muslims in Europe and that second-generation migrants consider themselves less concerned about the traditional and popular sources of religious leadership and authority. In relation to the findings of my PhD study, in this contribution, I elaborate on several factors to shed some light on the possible reasons behind these different findings. These factors are, in turn, the lack of language skills and knowledge of the local culture, the politization of Diyanet's institutional culture, and the secularization of young immigrant identity. While discussing these factors, I evaluated their role in the formation of the public image of imams. The results indicate that the image of the imam in Dutch-Turkish Muslim communities is not uniform. On the one hand, there are the educated interviewees and spiritually oriented respondents, who generally criticize the ignorance of most imams and the irrelevance of their sermons to young Muslims in Europe. On the other hand, there are the less educated respondents and the respondents who strongly experience popular religiosity, who do not question the authority of imams. The image of the imam in the minds of the majority of Dutch-Turkish Muslims is positive and retains its authority.differences into account, this study is concerned with investigating how the image of imams is shaped in the minds of Dutch-Turkish Muslims in relation to spiritual (elite) religiosity and popular religiosity.Public debates in the Netherlands assume there is an inherent tension between the traditional task of the imam and his tasks in the secularized Dutch society. According to some scholars, mosque imams in the 1980s and 1990s had a much larger influence in the diaspora than in their home countries, because of the multiple functions that the mosque fulfilled in the diaspora [6,7]. Imams were in close contact with the public when performing their duties, which positively affected the public image of the imam. Today, however, second-and third-generation migrants tend to understand the language of their country of residence better than the mother tongue of their parents or grandparents, which has implications for the success of these imams in the Netherlands [6].Studies of the effect of age and generation on religiosity report that intense religious changes are taking place among second-generation migrants [8][9][10][11][12][13][14][15]. But the direction of this change is interpreted ...

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