How can ethnic reconciliation be achieved in conflict settings where populations are physically separated? We address this question by examining the role of “extended contact”—a form of indirect contact which entails learning about the contact experiences of others—in the context of Cyprus’s frozen conflict. We field a survey experiment in order to test two pathways through which extended contact works: (1) by helping build a common identity; and (2) by activating empathy. We find that our treatments are associated with greater trust in the outgroup and greater support for cross-ethnic interaction, but only among segments of the population that are initially less favorable toward reconciliation.

How does regime type affect the likelihood of negotiated settlements that end civil conflicts? A limited number of previous studies have offered divergent theories and mixed findings about whether democracy is an asset or a liability. I draw these disparate findings together and present a novel theory on why leaders under fully democratic and autocratic regimes may have a particularly difficult time in peacemaking, and how leaders in anocratic (hybrid) regimes are more likely to be successful in reaching negotiated settlements. Thus, I hypothesize that the relationship between regime type and the likelihood of conflict-resolution is inverted U-shaped. I test this hypothesis using data on all internal conflicts between 1946 and 2014, and find empirical support. The findings suggest that even if anocracies are more prone to the outbreak of civil wars as has been proposed by previous studies, they are also better at settling these conflicts.

Naming and shaming has been widely used by governments and non-governmental organizations to address human rights violations. Yet despite the prevalence of this foreign policy instrument, the question of when states publicly denounce norm-violators received relatively little scholarly attention. We examine this question in the context of China’s repression of its Uyghur minority. This case offers a unique opportunity to study not only when countries engage in naming and shaming but also when they explicitly defend or endorse rights violations. We analyze the official positions of 174 countries between 2019 and 2021. We find that while geopolitical alignment is a significant predictor of both shaming and defending, a nation’s strong trade links with China has a less straightforward effect. Similarly, while democracies are significantly less likely to defend China’s Uyghur policy, they are not more likely to denounce it. We also find that identity-related factors have a muted effect. The paper advances our understanding of a broader spectrum of government behavior vis-a-vis human rights violations in other countries, and has implications for the role of identity in inter-state shaming.

Public opinion is central to understanding when states enforce human rights abroad. Yet we do not have firm evidence regarding why individuals demand government action in some cases of human rights violations, but not others. I argue that economic interests and shared identity play important roles. I employ a pre-registered survey experiment in Turkey measuring the extent to which individuals support sanctioning China for its repressive policies against the minority Uyghur population. Results provide partial support for my hypotheses. The findings have implications for the question of international human rights enforcement.

No abstract