This paper deals with the metaphor ‘law is language’ coined by James Boyd White and how it can be useful to understand the concept of legal language, connections between law and language and how the term language is used in the legal realm. In the beginning, the article aims to give an overview of possible approaches to legal language and continues with further analysis of one of them (the above-mentioned White’s proposition). By applying a semiotic approach to this concept, namely Saussure’s theory of distinguishing between langue (language) and parole (speaking), the paper helps to understand that language (and even legal language) can be understood in two different forms. It can be either considered an abstract system of signs, or it can be comprehended as individual speech acts – langue and parole, respectively. White’s metaphor is usually used in the meaning of texts, way of reading, writing and speaking. However, such conception corresponds to language in the sense of parole. These considerations lead at the end of the article towards the communicative theory of law and its merits to jurisprudence. According to a given doctrine, in some instances it can be more accurate to consider law as communication rather than language (and vice versa). Nevertheless, in either case, it is essential to bear in mind the distinction between both of the concepts.

V prvorepublikových novinách přitahovala zraky mnoha čtenářů rubrika obvykle nazvaná jako Soudní síň. Tyto sloupky obsahovaly různé příběhy na pomezí publicistického a uměleckého stylu čerpající náměty z reálných soudobých soudních řízení – tzv. soudničky. Tento článek se zaobírá popsaným žánrem a tím, jaký obraz práva soudničky podávaly a jak mohly působit na vnímání práva ve společnosti. Vzhledem k značné popularitě a určité masovosti daného žánru jej lze proto považovat za součást právní popkultury. Na základě tohoto spojení pak článek dospívá k závěru, že soudničky mají významný potenciál působit na vnímání práva ve společnosti. Avšak spíše než jako rozšiřování znalostní složky právního vědomí působí jako impuls k prohlubování „zájmu“ o právo. Na závěr textu je též zdůrazněn kultivační faktor četby soudniček i pro současné právníky.

Many legal theorists and linguists have addressed the notion of legal language from different perspectives. Despite that, the definitions of legal language vary. Almost all of the approaches conclude that legal language entails several types of communication. Nevertheless, not all of these categories are sufficiently researched. Some types of legal communication seem to be neglected. This lack of interest might be rooted in the uncertainty of whether these texts or utterances even fall under the scope of the concept of legal language. In order to avoid this superficiality in subsequent research, it is first necessary to come to a clear determination of which communicative acts can be considered a part of legal language and which cannot. Accordingly, in this search for the definition of legal language, we should not neglect the fact that language is executed in concrete communicative acts, and the only means to grasp the language is through communication. The aim of this article is therefore to clearly delineate the boundaries of this concept. Based on analysis of how the given term is currently defined, I draw out the common features and trace the characteristics in which they differ. Taking into account these findings, I propose a novel comprehensive demarcation of legal language. This concept argues that the ‘legal’ nature of language should be determined by the context and function of the particular statement or exchange, in connection with the role of participants in the communication. This means that a particular act may be considered a part of legal language not in accordance with a certain form or lexicon used, but mainly by extralinguistic circumstances in the context of which it is being performed.