We study the roles that migration and remittances play in the human capital formation of children in Egypt. Our estimations reveal a significant association between remittances and human capital formation: the higher the probability of receipt of remittances, the higher the probability of school enrollment, and the older the age at which children enter the labor force.Although, with regard to the likelihood of school enrollment and the age of the first participation in the labor force, the family disruption effect of migration dominates the income effect of remittances, the likelihood of labor force participation decreases even in households from which both parents migrated.

The main objective of this paper is to evaluate the impact of the environmental stringency on trade and the foreign direct investments (FDI) in particular. To do so, both theoretical and empirical investigations are performed. During the empirical investigation, an index of environmental sensitivity performance (IESP) is constructed for the OECD countries. Additionally, the main determinants of the OECD countries' FDI outflows are also analysed alongside with the environmental sensitivity variable for the countries in the sample. The empirical analysis in this paper finds some evidence to suggest that environmental stringency has an important impact on the FDI outflows of the OECD countries. The impact of the degree of environmental stringency on the FDI is significantly positive implying a direct relationship between FDI outflows and relative environmental sensitivity performance of the OECD countries.

This study scrutinizes the ramifications of the strategic use of a consumer welfare argument in regulating foreign acquisitions and foreign market entry (i) on a multinational's choice between acquiring a local firm's existing assets (via negotiations or auctions) and investing in new assets via greenfield entry, or trade, under both complete and incomplete information; and (ii) on welfare. Any foreign acquisition fulfilling a minimum output requirement imposed by the host country as part of the foreign market entry regulation is in the best interest of the multinational even when there is complete trade liberalization. A local firm appropriates a bigger share from acquisition gains in an auction, and prefers generating information asymmetries. Welfare improves with a larger scope for ex-post firm heterogeneity when the foreign market entry regulation includes a minimum output requirement for foreign acquisitions based on consumer welfare.

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We scrutinize international trade arising from oligopolistic rivalry (reciprocal dumping) in a model where the goods are horizontally differentiated and where otherwise symmetric firms located in different regions adopt asymmetric strategies-one competing in prices and the other competing in quantities. Unidirectional and intra-industry trade appear endogenously in our framework. We show that as trade costs decline the equilibrium outcome will transition from autarky through a region of unidirectional trade, before intra-industry trade ultimately arises.In the unidirectional trade region, potential market entry by the rival has an impact on firm behavior even though the rival is not exporting. The implications of product differentiation and changing trade costs for trade volumes and for the gains from trade are asymmetric in general. Welfare may rise monotonically as trade costs fall for one of the economies, but will necessarily fall initially relative to autarky for the other.