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Concerned about the continued dominance of Western International Relations (IR) theories, the global IR community has proposed various measures to address disciplinary hierarchies through encouraging dialogue and pluralism. By investigating the pedagogical preferences of instructors from 45 countries, this paper questions the global IR initiative's emancipatory potential, arguing that disciplinary practices in IR resemble those of dependent development. The study develops a new typology of IR theoretical (IRT) scholarship and examines the readings assigned in 151 IRT syllabi worldwide for evidence of similarity, replication, and assimilation. The findings show that mainstream core IRTs dominate syllabi globally, regardless of region, language of instruction, or instructors' educational/linguistic backgrounds. This domination extends to periphery scholars not using their own local products. Even when they do seek alternative approaches, they prefer to import core alternatives, that is, critical traditions, rather than homegrown IRTs. Finally, the results show that even in syllabi taught in local languages the readings remain dominated by core IRT works. These findings expose a structural defect in the current cry for global IR, by revealing the system's dependent development paradox. The paper concludes with suggestions for creating a symmetric interdependent structure, in the aim of achieving a genuine globalization of IR.

This article investigates the emergence and puzzling termination of the Turkish–Israeli alliance (1996–2011). While a litany of studies has offered changing material circumstances, the conservative agenda of Turkey's AKP government, and other exogenous factors as possible explanations, these fail to capture the complexity of the situation. Instead, this article applies a modified neoclassical realist framework of analysis that longitudinally recontextualizes the alliance. Specifically, in both its inception and collapse, Turkey's elite decision-makers faced no apparent external threats and were free to pursue their favored foreign policy. Domestically, however, Turkey's elite structure was decisive. In the 1990s, the old elite used their institutional power to restrain emerging elites and used their alliance with Israel as a pretext to do so. A decade later, a new elite seized institutional power. No longer restrained domestically, and absent external enemies, the new elites targeted Israel as a menace to win further domestic support, but this eventuated in a series of events that led to the termination of the alliance. Overall, the article concludes that alliance policy can become erratic at the intersection of permissive international environments and elite-induced domestic conflicts.

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