The unique relations between the Israeli-armed forces and the local hi-tech industry have been identified as a strong explanatory variable for the Israeli hi-tech boom. This article highlights the role of the military as a socialization institution in those relations. We identify how the accumulation of “military capital” during military in service contributes to soldiers as veterans and employees in the hi-tech sector. Military service brings with it professional training, social ties, and social codes that influence the composition of the hi-tech workforce and hi-tech industry’s organizational and functional culture. Examination of Israeli hi-tech workers’ profiles reveals not only a very high proportion of military capital amongst the employees but also an institutional preference for those who possess it.

Facing barriers to change, policy entrepreneurs often shift their activities to a more favourable venue. In the new venue they either pressure the system from the outside, leading to policy punctuation, or make incremental changes within the existing system which over time will accumulate to a significant change in the status quo. This article aims to expand our understanding of policy entrepreneurs' role in the policy process by examining the strategies they use in the incremental path. Specifically, it focuses on one gradual change strategy, conversion – redirection of existing institutions to new purposes. Based on the case of policy entrepreneurs in the Holy Basin of Jerusalem, the findings indicate that when the entrepreneurs shift the venue to the bureaucracy they can establish cooperative relations with the government that will provide them with the needed capacities to exploit the gaps in the existing rules and redirect them to serve their aim.

The digital divide's implications on health inequality among American Military veterans has been discussed extensively in research; however, it remains unclear what is the association between Internet usage and health specifically among Veterans. We examine this question by addressing the growing digital gaps in the veteran population, looking at the association of Internet use and self-reported health. Using the National Survey of Veterans we find that compared to those who use the Internet daily, those who use the Internet less frequently have significantly higher odds of reporting “fair” or “poor” self-rated health. The significant association remained when demographic, socioeconomic, and military factors were controlled. While our results indicate that veterans that use the Internet more frequently report more favorable self-reported health, given our data we are unable to distinguish a causal relationship. We conclude by discussing potential policy interventions, targeting helping those who are left behind.

From an obscure sector synonymous with mercenaryism, the private military and security industry has grown to become a significant complementing instrument in military operations. This rise has brought with it a considerable attention. Researchers have examined the role of private military and security companies in international relations as well as the history of these companies, and, above all, the legal implications of their use in the place of military organizations. As research progresses, a significant gap has become clear. Only a handful of studies have addressed the complex of issues associated with contractors’ demographics and lived experience. This article sheds some light over this lacuna, examining contractors’ demographics using descriptive statistics from an original data set of American and British contractors who died in Iraq between the years 2003 and 2016. The article augments our understanding of an important population of post-Fordist-contracted workforce, those peripheral workers supplementing military activity in high-risk occupations with uncertain long-term outcomes.

The phrase outsourcing war has been used since the late 1990s to describe the trend toward the hiring of private military and security companies (PMSCs) by national governments to perform functions that previously had been assigned only to members of national military forces. These private companies, in turn, hire employees, usually on limited-term contracts, to carry out the missions that the companies have agreed to accomplish. PMSCs may undertake combat missions independently or in direct cooperation with deployed national military forces. They may be assigned to security missions in secret or to meet a highly visible demand, as in the case where the United States contributed private military contractors to the United Nations peacekeeping force in Kosovo in 1998. This was an early case in which privately contracted military employees were hired by one nation to function cooperatively with uniformed members of other national military forces. During the 20th century, private military forces had been considered a form of organized crime populated by mercenaries, a delinquent group at the fringes of the social order who traded in violence to advance the interests of anyone willing to pay them. By the beginning of the 21st century, however, the outsourcing of war and security functions to private companies had become commonplace, transforming the previously prevailing belief that only states had the right to wage war. States often deployed their militaries alongside PMSCs who were contracted to provide support to forces on the ground. In other cases, private companies would pay representatives of other private companies to defend their assets, such as oil fields or diamond mines. During this period at the turn of the 21st century, PMSCs came to be perceived as representatives of a legitimate industry. With this transformation, the nature of security and modern conflict changed as well. Private military and security companies became an important instrument in war-making and the projection of power.