BackgroundRigorous evaluations of health sector interventions addressing intimate partner violence (IPV) in low- and middle-income countries are lacking. We aimed to assess whether an enhanced nurse-delivered intervention would reduce IPV and improve levels of safety planning behaviors, use of community resources, reproductive coercion, and mental quality of life.MethodsWe randomized 42 public health clinics in Mexico City to treatment or control arms. In treatment clinics, women received the nurse-delivered session (IPV screening, supportive referrals, health/safety risk assessments) at baseline (T1), and a booster counselling session after 3 months (T2). In control clinics, women received screening and a referral card from nurses. Surveys were conducted at T1, T2, and T3 (15 months from baseline). Our main outcome was past-year physical and sexual IPV. Intent-to-treat analyses were conducted via three-level random intercepts models to evaluate the interaction term for treatment status by time.ResultsBetween April and October 2013, 950 women (480 in control clinics, 470 in treatment clinics) with recent IPV experiences enrolled in the study. While reductions in IPV were observed for both women enrolled in treatment (OR, 0.40; 95% CI, 0.28–0.55; P < 0.01) and control (OR, 0.51; 95% CI, 0.36–0.72; P < 0.01) clinics at T3 (July to December 2014), no significant treatment effects were observed (OR, 0.78; 95% CI, 0.49–1.24; P = 0.30). At T2 (July to December 2013), women in treatment clinics reported significant improvements, compared to women in control clinics, in mental quality of life (β, 1.45; 95% CI, 0.14–2.75; P = 0.03) and safety planning behaviors (β, 0.41; 95% CI, 0.02–0.79; P = 0.04).ConclusionWhile reductions in IPV levels were seen among women in both treatment and control clinics, the enhanced nurse intervention was no more effective in reducing IPV. The enhanced nursing intervention may offer short-term improvements in addressing safety planning and mental quality of life. Nurses can play a supportive role in assisting women with IPV experiences.Trial RegistrationClinicaltrials.gov (NCT01661504). Registration Date: August 2, 2012Electronic supplementary materialThe online version of this article (doi:10.1186/s12916-017-0880-y) contains supplementary material, which is available to authorized users.

Abstract. A vertex coloring of a tree is called convex if each color induces a connected component. The NP-hard Convex Recoloring problem on vertex-colored trees asks for a minimum-weight change of colors to achieve a convex coloring. For the non-uniformly weighted model, where the cost of changing a vertex v to color c depends on both v and c, we improve the running time on trees from O(∆ κ ·κn) to O(3 κ ·κn), where ∆ is the maximum vertex degree of the input tree T , κ is the number of colors, and n is the number of vertices in T . In the uniformly weighted case, where costs depend only on the vertex to be recolored, one can instead parameterize on the number of bad colors β ≤ κ, which is the number of colors that do not already induce a connected component. Here, we improve the running time from O(∆ β · βn) to O(3 β · βn). For the case where the weights are integers bounded by M , using fast subset convolution, we further improve the running time with respect to the exponential part to O(2 κ · κ 4 n 2 M log 2 (nM )) and O(2 β · β 4 n 2 M log 2 (nM )), respectively. Finally, we use fast subset convolution to improve the exponential part of the running time of the related 1-Connected Coloring Completion problem.

No abstract

Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. Terms of use: Documents in AbstractThe absence of the deselection threat in incumbents' last term in office can be negative or positive for society. Some politicians may reduce their efforts, while others may pursue beneficial long-term policies that may be unpopular in the short term. We propose a novel pension system that solves the effort problem while preserving willingness to implement long-term policies. The idea is to give politicians the option to choose between a flexible pension scheme and a fixed pension scheme. In a flexible pension scheme, the pension increases with short term performance as measured by the vote share of the officeholder's party in the next election. This system increases social welfare by letting officeholders self-select into those activities that most benefit society. We analyze the properties and consequences of such a system and assess its robustness. Finally, we extend the pension system with choice to non-last-term situations and derive a general welfare result.