We study the role of financial frictions and firm heterogeneity in determining the investment channel of monetary policy. Empirically, we find that firms with low default risk—those with low debt burdens and high “distance to default”— are the most responsive to monetary shocks. We interpret these findings using a heterogeneous firm New Keynesian model with default risk. In our model, low‐risk firms are more responsive to monetary shocks because they face a flatter marginal cost curve for financing investment. The aggregate effect of monetary policy may therefore depend on the distribution of default risk, which varies over time.

We study the role of financial frictions and firm heterogeneity in determining the investment channel of monetary policy. Empirically, we find that firms with low default risk-those with low debt burdens and high "distance to default"-are the most responsive to monetary shocks. We interpret these findings using a heterogeneous firm New Keynesian model with default risk. In our model, low-risk firms are more responsive to monetary shocks because they face a flatter marginal cost curve for financing investment. The aggregate effect of monetary policy may therefore depend on the distribution of default risk, which varies over time.

This paper uses a sample of 116 recession episodes in developed and emerging market economies to compare the labor-market recovery during financial crises with that of other recession episodes. It documents two new stylized facts. First, labor-market recovery from financial crises is characterized by either higher unemployment ("jobless recovery") or a lower real wage ("wageless recovery"). Second, inflation determines the type of recovery: low inflation (below 30 percent annual rate) is associated with jobless recovery, while high inflation is associated with wageless recovery. The paper shows that this pattern of labor recovery from financial crises is consistent with a simple model in which collateral requirements are higher (lower) when a larger share of labor costs (physical capital expenditure) is involved in a loan contract.

We study the currency composition of sovereign debt in emerging economies through the lens of a model in which the government lacks commitment regarding debt and monetary policy. High levels of debt in local currency give rise to incentives to dilute debt repayment through currency depreciation. Governments tilt the currency composition of debt toward foreign currency to avoid inflationary costs and real exchange rate distortions, at the expense of forgoing the hedging properties of local currency debt. Our quantitative model is used to shed light on the recent dynamics of the currency composition of debt and on its cyclical behavior. (JEL E31, E32, E52, F34, H63)