History is enamored of revolutions. This essay takes as its subject a revolution—the Young Turk Revolution of 1908—which overthrew one of the most enduring autocracies of early modern times. It concerns itself, however, with revolution of a specific kind, cartoon revolution: where images could take precedence over words; where the past, present, and future were created and imagined; where the celebration of new freedoms brought citizens into contact with menaces in the streets.

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I believe t h a t one writes, takes one's lumps in the reviewing process, and hopes that the thoughtful reader will read the work and evaluate the criticism. Professor Arbel's review, however, has raised some important issues; addressing them here will, I hope, serve to advance the dialogic process that academic publishing is supposed to be. Some of Arbel's criticisms are valid (the map errors are inexcusable for example); some exaggerate and misrepresent my arguments. Some suggest essential differences in our understanding of how one interprets and writes history. It is to these latter that I will devote most of my attention. First of all, Arbel is correct. My subject is not new and I have not proven my case. Indeed, there are many things that this book does not do. It does minimize the importance of Venetian fortresses, Cyprus, the silver trade, or the Adriatic (in favor of the Aegean) simply because it does not treat these subjects in depth. It has not attempted to illustrate the full range and complexity of the commodities shipped in the Mediterranean or of the Venetian tax system. But nowhere does it suggest that the Venetian (or the Ottoman) fiscal system was either simple or static. The Venetians, like the Ottomans, regularly altered and adjusted their taxes. Nonetheless, Pegolotti is one of the most comprehensive sources on the subject; it was used in the notes as an illustrative example, and is only one of a variety of sources used. My book does not simply equate corsairs and pirates; in fact, it includes a lengthy discussion (pp. 98-106) of the rhetorical confounding of navies, corsairs, and pirates. It has not suggested the "outright abandonment of trade by the Venetians" (Arbel here missed my point in citing Tucci); but it has assumed that the Ottomans never made a.conscious decision to abandon, avoid participation in, or leave control of the international trade to "minorities". It is true that there is no main entry under "Jews" in my index; interestingly enough, there are also no main entries under "Christians" or "Muslims." No one would deny the significance of Jews in the international trade. A great deal has been written on the subject of Jewish commercial activities, trading diasporas, and on the Ottoman "minority" traders. The fact that the Jews did trade, however, does not mean that the askeri did not. Also, the insistence on emphasizing the "minority" (usually a communal distinction) trade suggests that the "majority" remained aloof from trade

Link to this article: http://journals.cambridge.org/abstract_S0018246X00014291How to cite this article: Palmira Brummett (1993). The Overrated adversary: Rhodes and Ottoman naval power.