(6):863-904, 2013), both these frameworks can be used to express epistemic conditions for solution concepts in game theory. The main result of this paper is a formal comparison between the two and a statement of semantic equivalence with respect to two different logical systems: a doxastic logic for belief and an epistemic-doxastic logic for belief and knowledge. Moreover, a sound and complete axiomatization of these logics with respect to the two equivalent Kripke semantics and type spaces semantics is provided. Finally, a probabilistic extension of the result is also presented. A further result of the paper is a study of the relationship between the epistemic-doxastic logic for belief and knowledge and the logic STIT (the logic of "seeing to it that") by Belnap and colleagues (Facing the future: agents and choices in our indeterminist world, 2001).

Standard applications of evolutionary game theory look at a single, fixed game and focus on the evolution of behavior for that game alone. Instead, this paper uses tools from evolutionary game theory to study the evolutionary competition between choice mechanisms in a rich and variable multi-game environment. A choice mechanism is a way of subjectively representing a decision situation, paired with a method for choosing an act based on this subjective representation. We demonstrate the usefulness of this approach by a case study that shows how subjective representations in terms of regret that differ from the actual fitness can be evolutionarily advantageous.

In a recent paper, Christian List (2014) has argued for the compatibilism of free will and determinism. Drawing on a distinction between physical possibility (used in defining determinism) and agential possibility (used in defining free will), List constructs a formal two-level model in which the two concepts are consistent. This paper's first contribution is to show that though List's model is formally consistent, philosophically it falls short of establishing a satisfactory compatibilist position. Ensuingly, an analysis of the shortcomings of the model leads to the identification of a controversial epistemological assumption implicit in the statements of both compatibilist and incompatibilist positions. Arguing that this assumption is not currently satisfied, the paper's second contribution is to show that neither the compatibilist nor the incompatibilist position is presently well-founded.

Standard evolutionary game theory investigates the evolutionary fitness of alternative behaviors in a fixed and single decision problem. This paper instead focuses on decision criteria, rather than on simple behaviors, as the general behavioral rules under selection in the population: the evolutionary fitness of classic decision criteria for rational choice is analyzed through Monte Carlo simulations over various classes of decision problems. Overall, quantifying the uncertainty in a probabilistic way and maximizing expected utility turns out to be evolutionarily beneficial in general. Minimizing regret also finds some evolutionary justifications in our results, while maximin seems to be always disadvantaged by differential selection.