The practice of dowry in India has been theoretically linked to a number of factors including the nature of residence and inheritance system, women's role in production, kinship organizations, relative availability of potential spouses, and social stratification in society. This article empirically examines dowries in India and provides an institutional and economic rationale for the existence and continued prevalence of the system. Using data on marriage transactions and on the personal and family traits of marital partners the article demonstrates that payments of dowry serve to equalize the measurable differences in individual characteristics of the bride's and groom's and their respective households. Thus, dowry qualifies as the "price" paid for a "good match" in the marriage market. Results also reveal that the form of inheritance system, the residence of the bride after marriage, and the gender ratio of marriageable women to men have no effect on the incidence and size of dowry.

DIO, J12)

Agricultural technologies (new cultivars, inorganic fertilizers, soil‐and water‐conservation techniques) in Sub‐Saharan Africa have been primarily introduced to male farmers by male‐dominated extension services on the family plots. These yield‐increasing, input‐intensive technologies increase the demand for farm labor. So, not only do men obtain most of the direct benefits from the introduction of technology but this labor‐intensive technology also increases the demands on women's time for additional labor. This raises the question: Are the combined effects of agricultural technologies beneficial or detrimental to women? We first develop a labor‐market model that examines the impact of agricultural and household technologies on labor allocation and income determination within the household. We then discuss the important issue of how household labor‐allocation decisions and division of income are made within the family in Sub‐Saharan Africa. We use a programming model to estimate the effects of these technologies on household incomes and the income of women. The results indicate that the impact of agricultural technologies depends on the type of decision‐making prevailing in the household. In contrast, household technologies increase the welfare of women regardless of the type of decision‐making. However, with bargaining behavior, agricultural technologies do benefit women and there is some empirical support for this type of household behavior in Sub‐Saharan African households.

Agricultural technologies (new cultivars, inorganic fertilizers, soil-and water-conservation techniques) in Sub-Saharan Africa have been primarily introduced to male farmers by male-dominated extension services on the family plots. These yieldincreasing, input-intensive technologies increase the demand for farm labor. So, not only do men obtain most of the direct benefits from the introduction of technology but this labor-intensive technology also increases the demands on women's time for additional labor. This raises the question: Are the combined effects of agricultural technologies beneficial or detrimental to women? We first develop a labor-market model that examines the impact of agricultural and household technologies on labor allocation and income determination within the household. We then discuss the important issue of how household laborallocation decisions and division of income are made within the family in Sub-Saharan Africa. We use a programming model to estimate the effects of these technologies on household incomes and the income of women. The results indicate that the impact of agricultural technologies depends on the type of decision-making prevailing in the household. In contrast, household technologies increase the welfare of women regardless of the type of decision-making. However, with bargaining behavior, agricultural technologies do benefit women and there is some empirical support for this type of household behavior in Sub-Saharan African households.

No abstract