Solar photovoltaic (PV) systems have experienced strong market growth over the last decade. Since the mid‐2000s, the increase in demand in line with policy supports in Europe has attracted the Chinese players into the PV manufacturing market. Chinese production soared in a short time and managed to quickly reduce the cost thanks to large‐scale supply with mass‐produced products. Faced with the global economic crisis, the European countries began reducing their policy supports that caused a decrease in the demand for PV installations. Despite such a market situation, Chinese PV manufacturers have continued to produce large quantities of solar PV products and thereby aggravated the global PV industry situation with a global supply–demand imbalance. China's rapid market expansion without domestic market development has brought unexpected results with an oversupply of PV materials and equipment in a global market and destabilized the PV market. It influenced the PV policy mechanisms of other countries. Many PV firms in the world have since gone into bankruptcy. China and Europe lately went through a trade dispute over the Chinese solar panel imports (dumping suspicion). In this context, this study aims to identify the PV policy mechanisms based on a multiperspective approach in Germany, Japan, and China. A systematic logical framework is proposed and then used to explain each country's PV policy strategy and results. Moreover, PV globalization impacts and interactions among them are studied using the international trade theory. At the end, this research also attempts to seek optimal strategies to improve the global PV mechanisms. Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

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The aim of our paper is to determine the efficiency of asymmetric regulation of mobile termination rates (MTRs) in a market where firms are differentiated in size and with commercial offers including calling club effects. Major regulatory issues are related to these analyses, since some European National Regulatory Authorities and the European Commission tend to question asymmetric regulation mechanisms. Based on a model designed to determine firm profits and consumer surplus, our main results are the following: a) Asymmetric regulation of MTRs may contribute to increase welfare. If the impact is neutral regarding firms (simple reallocation of profits from the large to the small player), consumer surplus is increased; b) The appropriate way to proceed is to decrease the large firm's MTRs, rather than increasing the smaller firm's ones, which could produce negative side effects; c) From a dynamic point of view, appropriate asymmetric regulation may contribute to balance market shares and, in such a way, to compensate first mover advantages.

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