Physicians saw the need for the new approach and supported its aim. However, its design and implementation appeared to be questionable from their medical perspective. The provision of summarized information on the benefit of technologies might be a possibility to assist physicians' decision making.

This paper empirically investigates the impact of additional reimbursement instruments on the diffusion of new technologies in inpatient care. Using 2010-2014 German panel data on hospital level for every patient undergoing coronary angioplasty, this study examines the utilisation of drug-eluting balloon catheters (DEB) over time while additional payment instruments changed.Hypothesising that the utilisation of DEB increased abruptly when a new reimbursement instrument came into force, we estimate a fixed effects regression comparing years with a change and years where the reimbursement instrument remained the same. The model is adjusted for patient age and severity of the disease. The utilisation of DEB increased from 8,407 in 2010 to 19,065 in 2014. Hospitals used significantly more DEB when an additional payment instrument changed compared to years when it remained the same. The increase was roughly twice as large. In short, hospitals are incentivised to utilise new technologies if the reimbursement changes to an instrument that is designed in a more reliable way, e.g. including less bureaucracy or guaranteeing fixed prices.

Most hospital payment systems based on diagnosis-related groups (DRGs) provide payments for newly approved technologies. In Germany, they are negotiated between individual hospitals and health insurances. The aim of our study is to assess the functioning of temporary reimbursement mechanisms. We used multilevel logistic regression to examine factors at the hospital and state levels that are associated with agreeing innovation payments. Dependent variable was whether or not a hospital had successfully negotiated innovation payments in 2013 (n = 1532). Using agreement data of the yearly budget negotiations between each German hospital and representatives of the health insurances, the study comprises all German acute hospitals and innovation payments on all diagnoses. In total, 32.9% of the hospitals successfully negotiated innovation payments in 2013. We found that the chance of receiving innovation payments increased if the hospital was located in areas with a high degree of competition and if they were large, had university status and were private for-profit entities. Our study shows an implicit self-controlled selection of hospitals receiving innovation payments. While implicitly encouraging safety of patient care, policy makers should favour a more direct and transparent process of distributing innovation payments in prospective payment systems.

No abstract

No abstract