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ObjectiveThe objective of this study was to analyze the costs and benefits of the MRSA Search and Destroy (S&D) policy between 2008 and 2013 in the Kennemer Gasthuis, a 400 bed teaching hospital in the region Kennemerland, the Netherlands.MethodsA patient registration database was used to retrospectively calculate costs, including screening, isolation, follow-up, contact tracing, cleaning, treatment, deployment of extra healthcare workers, salary for an infection control practitioner (ICP) and service of isolation rooms. The estimated benefits (costs and lives when no MRSA S&D was applied) were based on a varying MRSA prevalence rate (up to 50%).ResultsWhen no MRSA S&D policy was applied, the additional costs and deaths due to MRSA bacteraemia were estimated to be € 1,388,907 and 33 respectively (at a MRSA prevalence rate of 50%). Currently, the total costs were estimated to be € 290,672 (€ 48,445 annually) and a MRSA prevalence rate of 17.3% was considered as break-even point. Between 2008 and 2013, a total of 576 high risk patients were screened for MRSA carriage, of whom 19 (3.3%) were found to be MRSA positive. Forty-nine patients (72.1%) were found unexpectedly.ConclusionsApplication of the MRSA S&D policy saves lives and money, although the high rate of unexpected MRSA cases is alarming.

BackgroundThis paper describes (1) the Highly Resistant Gram Negative Rod (HR-GNR) prevalence rate, (2) their genotypes, acquired resistance genes and (3) associated risk factors of HR-GNR colonization among the hospitalized population in the Dutch region Kennemerland.MethodsBetween 1 October 2013 and 31 March 2014, cross-sectional prevalence measurements were performed in three regional hospitals as part of each hospitals infection control program. Rectal swabs were analyzed at the Regional Public Health Laboratory Kennemerland by direct culturing. Genotypes and acquired resistance genes of positive isolates were determined using Whole Genome Sequencing with the MiSeq instrument (Illumina). Association between several independent variables and HR-GNR positivity was examined using logistic regression models.ResultsOut of 427 patients, 24 HR-GNR positive isolates were recovered from 22 patients, resulting in a regional HR-GNR colonization prevalence (95 % CI) of 5.2 % (3.6–7.9). Of these 22 positive patients, 15 were Extended Spectrum Beta-Lactamase (ESBL) positive (3.5 % (2.1–5.7)), 7 patients were positive for a Fluoroquinolones and Aminoglycosides (Q&A) resistant Enterobacteriaceae (1.6 % (0.8–3.3)) and from one patient (0.2 % (0–1.3)) a Stenotrophomonas maltophilia resistant towards co-trimoxazole was isolated. No carbapenemase producing Enterobacteriaceae (CPE), multi-resistant Acinetobacter species or multi-resistant Pseudomonas aeruginosa were isolated. The ESBL genes found were blaCTX-M-1 (n = 4, 25.0 %), blaCTX-M-15 (n = 3, 18.8 %), blaCTX-M-27 (n = 2, 12.5 %), blaCTX-M-14b (n = 2, 12.5 %), blaCTX-M-9 (n = 2, 12.5 %), blaCTX-M-14 (n = 1, 6.3 %), blaCTX-M-3 (n = 1, 6.3 %), blaSHV-11 (n = 1, 6.3 %) and blaSHV-12 (n = 1, 6.3 %). Being known HR-GNR positive in the past was the only significant associated risk factor for HR-GNR positivity, odds ratio (95 % CI): 7.32 (1.82–29.35), p-value = 0.005.ConclusionsSimilar ESBL prevalence rates and genotypes (3.5 %) were found in comparison to other Dutch studies. When previously HR-GNR positive patients are readmitted, they should be screened for HR-GNR colonization since colonization with GR-GNRs could be prolonged. We recommend for future studies to include all defined HR-GNRs in addition to ESBLs in prevalence studies, in order to obtain a more comprehensive overview of colonization with HR-GNRs.

BackgroundMany Highly Resistant Gram Negative Rod (HR-GNR) positive patients are found unexpectedly in clinical cultures, besides patients who are screened and isolated based on risk factors. As unexpected HR-GNR positive patients are isolated after detection, transmission to contact patients possibly occurred. The added value of routine contact tracing in such situations within hospitals with standard hygiene precautions is unknown.MethodsIn 2014, this study was performed as a prospective cohort study. Index patients were defined as those tested unexpectedly HR-GNR positive in clinical cultures to diagnose a possible infection and were nursed under standard hygiene precautions before tested positive. After detection they were nursed in contact isolation. Contact patients were still hospitalized and shared the same room with the index patient for at least 12 h. HR-GNR screening was performed by culturing a rectal and throat swab. Clonal relatedness of HR-GNR isolates was determined using whole genome sequencing (WGS).ResultsOut of 152 unexpected HR-GNR positive patients, 35 patients (23.0%) met our inclusion criteria for index patient. ESBL E. coli was found most frequently (n = 20, 57.1%), followed by Q&A E. coli (n = 10, 28.6%), ESBL K. pneumoniae (n = 3, 8.5%), ESBL R. ornithinolytica (n = 1, 2.9%) and multi resistant P. aeruginosa (n = 1, 2.9%). After contact tracing, 69 patients were identified as contact patient of an index patient, with a median time between start of contact and sampling of 3 days. None were found HR-GNR positive by nosocomial transmission.ConclusionsIn a local setting within hospitals with standard hygiene precautions, routine contact tracing among unexpected HR-GNR positive patients may be replaced by appropriate surveillance as we found no nosocomial transmission in short term contacts.