We review studies suggesting time disorders on both automatic and subjective levels in patients with schizophrenia. Patients have difficulty explicitly discriminating between simultaneous and asynchronous events, and ordering events in time. We discuss the relationship between these difficulties and impairments on a more elementary level. We showed that for undetectable stimulus onset asynchronies below 20 ms, neither patients nor controls merge events in time, as previously believed. On the contrary, subjects implicitly distinguish between events even when evaluating them to be simultaneous. Furthermore, controls privilege the last stimulus, whereas patients seem to stay stuck on the first stimulus when asynchronies are sub-threshold. Combining previous results shows this to be true for patients even for asynchronies as short as 8 ms. Moreover, this peculiarity predicts difficulties with detecting asynchronies longer than 50 ms, suggesting an impact on the conscious ability to time events. Difficulties on the subjective level are also correlated with clinical disorganization. The results are interpreted within the framework of predictive coding which can account for an implicit ability to update events. These results complement a range of other results, by suggesting a difficulty with binding information in time as well as space, and by showing that information processing lacks continuity and stability in patients. The time perspective may help bridge the gap between cognitive impairments and clinical symptoms, by showing how the innermost structure of thought and experience is disrupted.

Previous studies have suggested that even if subjects deem two visual stimuli less than 20 ms apart to be simultaneous, implicitly they are nonetheless distinguished in time. It is unclear, however, how information is encoded within this short timescale. We used a priming paradigm to demonstrate how successive visual stimuli are processed over time intervals of less than 20 ms. The primers were two empty square frames displayed either simultaneously or with a 17ms asynchrony. The primers were followed by the target information after a delay of 25 ms to 100 ms. The two square frames were filled in one after another with a delay of 100 ms between them, and subjects had to decide on the location of the first of the frames to be filled in. In a second version of the paradigm, only one square frame was filled in, and subjects had to decide where it was positioned. The influence of the primers is revealed through faster response times depending on the location of the first and second primers. Experiment 1 replicates earlier results, with a bias towards the side of the second primer, but only when there is a delay of 75 to 100 ms between primers and targets. The following experiments suggest this effect to be relatively independent of the task context, except for a slight effect on the time course of the biases. For the temporal order judgment task, identical results were observed when subjects have to answer to the side of the second rather than the first target, showing the effect to be independent of the hand response, and suggesting it might be related to a displacement of attention. All in all the results suggest the flow of events is followed more efficiently than suggested by explicit asynchrony judgment studies. We discuss the possible impact of these results on our understanding of the sense of time continuity.