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Cambodia and Sri Lanka are two tiny states where China has no major strategic stakes. Yet China has been a key regime ally to both regimes at a critical moment during the alleged genocides of 1975–1979 in Cambodia and of 2009 in Sri Lanka. While the failure of Western interventionist peace-building models has been widely discussed, the patterns and outcomes of Chinese non-intervention have not. How did China’s scrupulous respect for non-intervention affect the alleged genocides? The article supports the viewpoint that Chinese non-interference in both states was built on the notion that the building of an independent nation was a top priority in securing sovereignty, order and unity. Hence, China focused on bilateral military aid and economic development, whilst shielding both governments from external scrutiny and international accountability during and after the alleged genocides. China has since made efforts to address and resolve national conflicts through concerted United Nations (UN) procedures and mechanisms.

War reconciliation and cultures of memory themes continue to receive high attention but despite the long list of newly released books praising Germany which has been thought to be more prone to experience guilt and from it ensuing war responsibility for its past than the Japanese nation in the aftermath of World War Two [46], the long shadows of the past are still prevailing in both countries. Even if Germany scores better then Japan from a comparative perspective this does not mean that Germany has internally resolved the problems related to its past once and for all. Yet, the slave labor compensation legislation in Germany which was meant to definitely settle the accounts with the past has shown that lasting war reconciliation is possible. The unwillingness of Japanese Government officials to admit past wrongdoings, to apologize for coerced war prostitution and to refuse to compensate former slave laborers has put Japan on the frontline of international criticism. The claim that Japan as a nation has not learned from history is critically re-assessed against the backdrop of bottom up NGO reconciliation activities and lawmaker efforts to enact legislation aimed at resolving the comfort women issue. In contrast to conventional explanations it is argued that different circumstances, influenced by distinct historical and political factors in each country, resulted in different approaches. In Germany the social protest movements led to the institutional birth of the Green Party. The Greens initiated the reconciliation process for former slave laborers and changed the political landscape from the bottom. In Japan the social protest movements did not succeed to settle as a novel political force. Thoughtlessness, ignorance, conspiracy of silence, "double victimization" stigma, "negative pacifism" and the reluctance to address the war guilt issue prevented a public discussion. It is then sought to answer the question: Why do people repress or deny past wrongdoings despite knowing the facts? It is looked at how consecutive generations in Germany and Japan have coped with guilt and shame feelings in different ways. The article concludes that war reconciliation similar to restorative justice is an ongoing, never-ending process. The emotional part of reconciliation which goes far beyond words of apology, judicial punishment or monetary compensation and does not necessarily lead always to positive outcomes is given particular attention. Ways of civil society bottom-up reconciliation in Germany and Japan are explored.

Japan has great knowledge and state-of-the-art systems in place to face tsunami risk. Nevertheless, after the 3/11 Tohoku tsunami disaster, plans have been reviewed nationwide to strengthen tsunami preparedness in the event of a mega-tsunami. This article supports the opinion that despite improvements and progress made in risk assessment, tsunami disaster mitigation planning faces great challenges in securing mass evacuation. Findings of a field interview survey conducted among local residents supplemented by a thorough review of local risk-assessment policies and disaster-management plans suggest that residents do not believe that they are sufficiently prepared to escape a mega-tsunami despite very advanced risk-control systems. The reasons for this are two-fold: first, local autonomy is hampered by top-down prefectural and national interference, and second, realistic response planning for if the protective measures fail has not been sufficiently enforced.