I present a complex theoretical explanation that draws on multiple bodies of literature to present an academically rigorous version of a simple argument: good deeds earn chits. I advance/defend three core assertions: (1) corporate philanthropy can generate positive moral capital among communities and stakeholders, (2) moral capital can provide shareholders with insurance-like protection for a firm's relationship-based intangible assets, and (3) this protection contributes to shareholder wealth. I highlight several managerial implications of these core assertions.

Do shareholders gain when managers disperse corporate resources through activities classified

\In this paper we argue that unobservable constructs lie at the core of a number of influential theories used in the strategic management literature-including agency theory, transaction cost theory, and the resource-based view of the firm. The debate over how best to deal with the problem of unobservables has raged in the philosophy of science literature for the best part of the current century. On the one hand, there are the positivists, who believe that theories containing unobservable constructs are only useful as tools for making predictions. According to positivists, such theories do not inform us about the deep structure of reality. On the other hand, there are the realists, who believe that our theories can give us knowledge about unobservables. Herein we review this debate, we argue for adopting a realist position, and we draw out the implications for strategic management research.

No abstract

corporate social responsibility, globalization, research methodologies, research questions,