In crisis situations, first responders are expected to act speedily, improvise, and do whatever is necessary to save lives and minimize damage; they should not wait for orders before they act. But while the benefits of quick action may be self-evident, there is little consideration in theory or practice of the moral costs that come with discretionary crisis decision-making. This article presents a framework for the ethical analysis of crisis decision-making on the front line. It is illustrated through a case study of the Memorial Hospital tragedy that played out in the days after Hurricane Katrina hit New Orleans. The conclusion explores the prospect of collective deliberation as a way to deal with the challenge of crisis-induced moral dilemmas.

Public integrity is a good thing, because it restores citizens' trust in government. This, in turn, is a good thing, because it promotes good government. Notwithstanding its truth, this argument creates a paradox for public officials who use it to justify integrity. On the one hand, a government's sincere commitment to integrity entails an obligation to reveal its own violations of integrity, which is not likely to increase trust. On the other hand, such revelations nonetheless must be made, for not to do so would constitute a violation of the commitment to integrity. The paradox arises from a failure to appreciate the nature of the concept of integrity.Why would a government feel the need to justify public integrity? The habitual answer goes: in order to breed trust among citizens. If the people trust their government, this is good for the government, for the citizens themselves, and for democracy. This is a familiar story, but it is a story public officials should handle with care.

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Moral pluralism is fashionable. However, the implications of moral pluralism for the investment an agent is prepared to make in his practical thinking are potentially self-defeating. In the public realm, with its added responsibility, an examination of these implications is all the more important. This article argues that we shall only be in a position to subscribe to pluralism in practice if certain moral dispositions, such as the virtues, are already in place. Pluralism requires responsibly choosing, but this presupposes the courage or the truthfulness not to recoil from apparently rationally insoluble moral conflict.

One argument for deliberative democracy is that public deliberation enhances a sincere concern for the common good. Most of the theories of deliberative democracy fail to give a satisfying account of this process. One of the causes for this state of affairs is a preoccupation with autonomy, which tends to obscure that public deliberation is deliberation with others who are actually present. On such an interpretation of publicity, shame, or a concern for reputation, plays a crucial motivational role. Aristotle, by acknowledging this role, is capable of constructing an account of the formation of deliberative character that is far more realistic than the standard answer of deliberative democrats. In particular, it is shown that public deliberation cannot discharge its edifying or civilizing function all by itself. To have the desired effect, the development of the deliberative capacity requires the acquisition of the virtues of character, especially that of truthfulness.