We hypothesize that there is a general bias, based on both innatepredispositions and experience, in animals and humans, to give greater weight to negative entities (e.g., events, objects, personal traits). This is manifested in 4 ways: (a) negative potency (negative entities are stronger than the equivalent positive entities), (b) steeper negative gradients (the negativity of negative events grows more rapidly with approach to them in space or time than does the positivity of positive events, (c) negativity dominance (combinations of negative and positive entities yield evaluations that are more negative than the algebraic sum of individual subjective valences would predict), and (d) negative differentiation (negative entities are more varied, yield more complex conceptual representations, and engage a wider response repertoire). We review evidence for this taxonomy, with emphasis on negativity dominance, including literary, historical, religious, and cultural sources, as well as the psychological literatures on learning, attention, impression formation, contagion, moral judgment, development, and memory. We then consider a variety of theoretical accounts for negativity bias. We suggest that 1 feature of negative events that make them dominant is that negative entities are more contagious than positive entities.

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We approach disgust as a food-related emotion and define it as revulsion at the prospect of oral incorporation of offensive objects. These objects have contamination properties; if they even briefly contact an otherwise acceptable food, they tend to render it inedible. Drawing on sources from many cultures, we explore the implications of this perspective on disgust. Some of the issues we consider are the nature of the objects of disgust and why they are virtually all of animal origin, the meaning of oral incorporation, the "belief" that people take on the properties of the foods they eat. and the nature of the contamination response and its relation to the laws of sympathetic magic (similarity and contagion). We consider the ontogeny of disgust, which we believe develops during the first 8 years of life. We explore the idea that feces, the universal disgust object, is also the first, and we examine the mechanisms for the acquisition of disgust. We recommend disgust as an easily studiable emotion, a model for cognitive-affective linkages, and a model for the acquisition of values and culture. Disgust has been recognized as a basic emotion since Darwin (1872/1965). Like other basic emotions, disgust has a characteristic facial expression (Ekman & Friesen, 1975;Izard, 1971), an appropriate action (distancing of the self from an offensive object), a distinctive physiological manifestation (nausea), and a characteristic feeling state (revulsion). With these impeccable credentials, it is surprising that disgust is hardly mentioned in introductory psychology texts or texts on social psychology or motivation. No doubt this is because, apart from the study of the characteristic facial expression, there has been very little research on disgust (see Izard, 1977, for a review). Disgust as a Food-Related Emotion In this article, we elaborate a perspective on disgust that takes as its starting point a more circumscribed view of the emotion than is implied by the definition above. We define disgust as a food-related emotion and focus our definition not on its expression but on the properties of the organism-object interactions that elicit disgust. Our definition is as follows: Revulsion at the prospect of (oral) incorporation of an

It is proposed that 3 emotions-contempt, anger, and disgust-are typically elicited, across cultures, by violations of 3 moral codes proposed by R. A. Shweder and his colleagues (R. A. Shweder, N. C. Much, M. Mahapatra, & L. Park, 1997). The proposed alignment links anger to autonomy (individual rights violations), contempt to community (violation of communal codes, including hierarchy), and disgust to divinity (violations of purity-sanctity). This is the CAD triad hypothesis. Students in the United States and Japan were presented with descriptions of situations that involve 1 of the types of moral violations and asked to assign either an appropriate facial expression (from a set of 6) or an appropriate word (contempt, anger, disgust, or their translations). Results generally supported the CAD triad hypothesis. Results were further confirmed by analysis of facial expressions actually made by Americans to the descriptions of these situations.