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This paper examines the complex relationship between the embeddedness of multinational enterprises (MNEs) in host-country political networks and their long-run competitive positions in host emerging markets. We report the findings of a longitudinal study of the Chinese automobile sector from the early 1980s to the mid 2000s. Using data from 142 interviews over 11 years, and a wide range of secondary sources, we explore the process through which the value of political embeddedness changed over time in the face of profound and rapid changes in host-country business environments. On the basis of this longitudinal study, the paper unravels the underlying mechanisms that lead to the declining, and even negative, value of deep political embeddedness by MNEs in a politically stable emerging economy.

Resource dependence theorists argue that boards of directors with political capital can benefit focal firms by reducing uncertainty and providing preferential resources. Here, we develop theory regarding the downside of board political capital. As the principal-principal agency problem characterizes many parts of the world, we argue that board political capital can exacerbate this problem by enabling large blockholders to undertake more appropriation of firm wealth. Further, we explore how this enabling effect is moderated by ownership-, industry-, and environment-level contingencies. We find empirical support for our arguments using 32,174 directors in 1,046 Chinese listed firms over the period 2008 -2011. Our study sheds light on new ways in which resource dependence and agency theories can be integrated to advance the extant research on board governance and corporate political strategy. ABSTRACTResource dependence theorists argue that boards of directors with political capital can benefit focal firms by reducing uncertainty and providing preferential resources. Here, we develop theory regarding the downside of board political capital. As the principal-principal agency problem characterizes many parts of the world, we argue that board political capital can exacerbate this problem by enabling large blockholders to undertake more appropriation of firm wealth. Further, we explore how this enabling effect is moderated by ownership-, industry-, and environment-level contingencies. We find empirical support for our arguments using 32,174 directors in 1,046 Chinese listed firms over the period 2008 -2011. Our study sheds light on new ways in which resource dependence and agency theories can be integrated to advance the extant research on board governance and corporate political strategy.

Two parallel strands of nonmarket strategy research have emerged largely in isolation. One strand examines strategic corporate social responsibility (CSR), and the other examines corporate political activity (CPA), even though there is an overlap between the social and political aspects of corporate strategies. In this article, we review and synthesize strategic CSR and CPA research published in top-tier and specialized academic journals between 2000 and 2014. Specifically, we (a) review the literature on the link between nonmarket strategy and organizational performance, (b) identify the mechanisms through which nonmarket strategy influences organizational performance, (c) integrate and synthesize the two strands-strategic CSR and CPA-of the literature, and (d) develop a multi-theoretical framework for improving our understanding of the effects of nonmarket strategy on organizational performance. We conclude by outlining a research agenda for future theoretical and empirical studies on the impact of nonmarket strategy on organizational outcomes.

6ABSTRACT Past research has recognized the contingent value of corporate political ties but