We analyze the learning of noisy teacher-generated examples by nonlinear and differentiable student perceptrons using the cavity method. The generic activation of an example is a function of the cavity activation of the example, which is its activation in the perceptron that learns without the example. Mean-field equations for the macroscopic parameters and the stability condition yield results consistent with the replica method. When a single value of the cavity activation maps to multiple values of the generic activation, there is a competition in learning strategy between preferentially learning an example and sacrificing it in favor of the background adjustment. We find parameter regimes in which examples are learned preferentially or sacrificially, leading to a gap in the activation distribution. Full phase diagrams of this complex system are presented, and the theory predicts the existence of a phase transition from poor to good generalization states in the system. Simulation results confirm the theoretical predictions.

We consider a version of large population games whose players compete for resources using strategies with adaptable preferences. The system efficiency is measured by the variance of the decisions. In the regime where the system can be plagued by the maladaptive behavior of the players, we find that diversity among the players improves the system efficiency, though it slows the convergence to the steady state. Diversity causes a mild spread of resources at the transient state, but reduces the uneven distribution of resources in the steady state.

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