The spread of an infectious disease can, in some cases, promote the propagation of other pathogens favoring violent outbreaks, which cause a discontinuous transition to an endemic state. The topology of the contact network plays a crucial role in these cooperative dynamics. We consider a susceptible-infected-removed-type model with two mutually cooperative pathogens: An individual already infected with one disease has an increased probability of getting infected by the other. We present a heterogeneous mean-field theoretical approach to the coinfection dynamics on generic uncorrelated power-law degree-distributed networks and validate its results by means of numerical simulations. We show that, when the second moment of the degree distribution is finite, the epidemic transition is continuous for low cooperativity, while it is discontinuous when cooperativity is sufficiently high. For scale-free networks, i.e., topologies with diverging second moment, the transition is instead always continuous. In this way we clarify the effect of heterogeneity and system size on the nature of the transition, and we validate the physical interpretation about the origin of the discontinuity.

Recent empirical studies have confirmed the key roles of complex contagion mechanisms such as memory, social reinforcement, and decay effects in information diffusion and behavior spreading. Inspired by this fact, we here propose a new agent–based model to capture the whole picture of the joint action of the three mechanisms in information spreading, by quantifying the complex contagion mechanisms as stickiness and persistence, and carry out extensive simulations of the model on various networks. By numerical simulations as well as theoretical analysis, we find that the stickiness of the message determines the critical dynamics of message diffusion on tree-like networks, whereas the persistence plays a decisive role on dense regular lattices. In either network, the greater persistence can effectively make the message more invasive. Of particular interest is that our research results renew our previous knowledge that messages can spread broader in networks with large clustering, which turns out to be only true when they can inform a non-zero fraction of the population in the limit of large system size.

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Punishment, especially selfish punishment, has recently been identified as a potent promoter in sustaining or even enhancing the cooperation among unrelated individuals. However, without other key mechanisms, the first-order social dilemma and second-order social dilemma are still two enduring conundrums in biology and the social sciences even with the presence of punishment. In the present study, we investigate a spatial evolutionary four-strategy prisoner׳s dilemma game model with avoiding mechanism, where the four strategies are cooperation, defection, altruistic and selfish punishment. By introducing the low level of random mutation of strategies, we demonstrate that the presence of selfish punishment with avoiding mechanism can alleviate the two kinds of social dilemmas for various parametrizations. In addition, we propose an extended pair approximation method, whose solutions can essentially estimate the dynamical behaviors and final evolutionary frequencies of the four strategies. At last, considering the analogy between our model and the classical Lotka-Volterra system, we introduce interaction webs based on the spatial replicator dynamics and the transformed payoff matrix to qualitatively characterize the emergent co-exist strategy phases, and its validity are supported by extensive simulations.