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This study explores the effects of governance structure and contracting out on municipal audit costs. There is economy of scale, asymmetric information and human asset specificity in municipal auditing. As a consequence, both unified governance and market contracting could result in high total audit costs for municipalities. According to Oliver Williamson, relational contracting has been a neglected issue in transaction costs analysis (TCA). We studied 47 municipalities in Finland and 298 municipalities in Norway using multivariate analysis. The municipal audit fees per capita were highest in Norway where the municipal audit market was regulated and had virtually no market contracting. The audit fees per capita increased most in Finland, possibly due to lowballing after the Finnish market was deregulated in 1997. The municipalities in both Finland and Norway predominantly used audit in relational contracting even though the audit fees per capita were relatively high. Relational contracting could be efficient when production, transaction and political costs are taken into account. The findings corroborated several core TCA propositions.

The paper examines the performance measurement (PM) of knowledge organizations as problems of search (design mode) and application (use mode). The argumentation of the paper focuses on university organizations as a case of illustration in examining limitations in PM systems, culturally shaped assumptions for designing and using PM systems and unintended consequences of using performance measurement information. The paper presents a conceptual model created to demonstrate the relationship between the cultural features of a knowledge‐intensive organizational context, the ambiguities in the objectives of PM systems and the behavioral consequences of performance measurement. It is argued that PM systems in universities are seen as structures of attention rather than formal systems of accountability. Consequently, given the cultural background, universities tend to diminish the significance of PM systems by practising game rationalities and politics of representation.